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THE MORAL PLAUSIBILITY OF CONTRACT: USING
THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH TO PREVENT
RESIDENT PHYSICIAN FATIGUE-RELATED MEDICAL
ERRORS
Samuel V Jonet
INTRODUCTION
At approximately 11:30 p.m., on March 4, 1984, Libby Zion, an
eighteen-year-old college student, visited the New York Hospital with an
earache and fever.' Although Libby's medical team, "consisting of two
physically present residents and an attending physician" available by
telephone, 2 was "specifically told she was taking Nardil," 3 one of the
resident physicians "prescribed an injection of Demerol," 4 a drug that has a
tendency to cause death when "taken in conjunction with Nardil." 5 Libby
"immediately began to suffer an adverse reaction" to this fatal
pharmaceutical cocktail. 6 Although "[s]he thrashed about violently" and
her fever surged, no physician saw her for approximately four hours.7 The
only attention Libby received was from an attendant who had restrained
her upon instruction from a resident physician "who had never examined
her."8 By 7:45 a.m. the next day, Libby was dead. 9

* Associate Pmfessor of law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL Major, Judge Advocate
General's Corps, USAR (Ret). The author sincerely thanks Kent Greenawalt, Neil Williams, Kevin Hopkins,
Kristen Adams, and Allen Kamp for their beneficial remarks on earlier drafts of this Article. The author also
thanks Ralph Ruebner, William Mock,Jr., and Timothy O'Neil for their helpful conversations regarding this
Article. The author greatly appreciates the research assistance of Katherine Rengel and Amanda Morgenstem,
and the research stipend provded by TheJohn Marshall law School.
1
Anthony Ciolli, Note, The Mal Reside Wokg HoursDeba A Ipsalfr 1ratelkralRadation
ofGraduateMakcal Eabcation, 7 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L & ETHICS 175,184 (2007) (citingTom Wicker, Dxmrs
in the lhkd, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1985, at Al 7); ClarkiJ. Lee, Comment, FeMralRulation ofHaopitalRaidat Work
Hs-m Feownat wits Ral 7df, 9J. HEALTH CARE L & POL'Y 162,175 (2006).
2 Ciolli, gpm note 1, at 184; Craig Horowitz, The DoctorIs Out, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Oct. 3, 2003, avilable at
http://nymag.com/nymetro/health/featurs/n_9426/.
3
Ciolli, spra note 1,at 184.
4 Id
5 Id
6 Id
Id; see aso David Kocieniewski, Libby Zon Ac Addns Ma~alTeamn Fas, NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 1994, at
A05, availableat 1994 WLNR 472597 (reiterating same).
8
Ciolli, supranote 1,at 184-85.
9
Lee,.supra note 1, at 176;.s also Ciollispra note 1, at 185 "By moming, Libby had passed away.).
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More than a decade later, a hospital physician admitted that the
resident physicians erred in their treatment of young Libby.10 A subsequent
investigation revealed that both resident physicians had been working for
eighteen hours or more by the time they examined Libby." Although a
grand jury did not issue criminal indictments, it acknowledged the poor
care that patients are at risk of receiving from overworked and fatigued
resident physicians.12
The fate of Libby Zion is not unique.'3 Scholars indicate medical errors
represent the "nation's sixth leading cause of death, killing more people
annually than automobile accidents or guns."' 4 Medical experts have
warned that resident physicians "are working far beyond the limits that
society deems acceptable in other sectors" where public safety is of vital
concern, and have found that the "practice is incompatible with a safe,
high-quality health[-]care system."' 5 In December 2008, the Institute of
Medicine, a national panel of medical experts, issued a report lamenting the
risks to patients caused by sleep deprivation, attributed to the lack of
enforcement of resident physician duty-hour restrictions.' 6 According to a
recent study, the biggest threat to the resident-physician performance is
sleep deprivation.' 7 Although a resident physician who works more than
eighty hours a week "commits 3 6 % more serious medical errors than one
who works normal hours," 8 many resident physicians report working
longer than twenty-four hours a day and more than eighty hours a week.' 9

10 Kocieniewski, supra note 7, at A05.
1IHorowitz, .pra note 2; Lee, supm note 1, at 176.
12 Ciollia.wra note 1, at 185.
13 Jennifer F. Whetsel, Grnginu Iau di ag

e OA=ORdang* the "Slepy Reidmf' P+oblon, 12

ANNALS HEALTH L 23, 36-37 (2003).

14 Ls Weishmd, Raionand ThWLaWs, 45 IAL9, 9(2009).
I5 David M. Gaba & Steven K Howard, Pamieut Sey- FatigueAmong Clcians and dSaefey of Padarts, 347
NEWENG.J.MED. 1249,1254(2002),amilableathttp://contentnejm.org/cgi/reprint/347/16/1249.pdf.
16 Tara Parker-Pope, Ee PandSks armge M Traiing ofMabcalRaidats,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, at
A23, available at2008 WLNR 23159567.
17 See M.H. Klaiman, Banded LaborOtaractoisicsof US 1sgraduateMacalTraining, 39J. HEALTH L 373,
378 (2006) (indicating sleep deprivation is "the largest sur residents face").
18 MedicalNewsToday.com, Sleep Deprived Doctors Commit More Serious Ermors,
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/artides/15551.php qastvisited Sept. 1,2009).
19
Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Interns' Crphncewit Aaiastm Coracilfor GraduateMedcalFAcadn
Work-Hour Imits, 296 JAMA 1063, 1066 (2006), amilable at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/
content/full/296/9/1063; see also Lee,
note 1, at 202 (citing a study indicating that of "25,176 residents
surveyed in [1489] residency pmgrams[,]" roughly 25% of the programs reported resident physicians working
more than eighty hours per week), Klaiman, mprm note 17, at 376-77 (noting that some resident physicians "may
work up to 136 hours per week"; Jamie Talan, Ihwonfor ugr*May Physican Residmr Voladng Cap on Work
Hossv Which Can Inamse Ris to Pahm4 Skr Sy, NEWSDAY, Sept 6, 2006, ovailable at 2006 WLNR 15430987
(reporting that 80% of resident physicians surveyed "said they worked longer than the standards permitted);

supra
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Despite the great weight of scholarship arguing in favor of reduced resident
physician duty hours, many supervising physicians assert that grueling dutyhour demands and sleep deprivation serve a legitimate and necessary
pedagogical objective within the resident-physician training process. 20
Indeed, the ongoing controversy within the medical community
regarding the role of sleep deprivation centers on the physiological
consequences of resident physician duty hours: the length of time resident
physicians should reasonably be expected to provide proper care to patients
without succumbing to the ill effects of sleep deprivation. 2 ' While the
medical profession struggles to reach a consensus regarding appropriate
limitations on the number of resident-physician duty hours or on a process
for resolving the controversy, the public harm associated with sleep
deprivation within residency hospitals continues to hover at catastrophic
levels. 22 The medical-error controversy has earned its way into the
mainstream media.2 3
While popular television "shows like 'Grey's
Anatomy' glamorize residency training as a gratifying rite of passage for
doctors," 24 the President of the United States25 and media icons like Oprah
Winfrey26 are making the public aware of the approximately 100,000
Scott Turner, Madcal Residauy. An Ewrrcise i Slap Dprivatun, GEORGE ST. J., Oct. 4, 2001, available at
http://www.bmwn.edu/Administion/GeorgeStreetjoumal/vol26/26GSJ06h.html ("To meet educational
and clinical obligations, most of the nation's 100,000 medical intems and residents work between 60 and 130
hours a week."); Kim Becker, Study Proves Cunent Work Hour Guidelines for Interns Are Unsafe,
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/artides/18966.php (last visited Sept 1,2009).
20 See Ann Pomeroy, The Dctor Is Sill In, HR MAG., Feb. 2002, at 37, 38-39, available at
http://findartides.com/p/artides/mim3495/is_2_47/ai_83058908/?tag-contentcoll ("Older doctors who
went through the same rite ofpassage may believe that it weeds out those who don't have 'the right stuff").
21 See CHERYL ULMER ET AL, RESIDENT DUTY HOURS: ENHANCING SIEEP, SuPERVISIoN, AND
SAFETY 47-48 (2009) (fiaming the duty-hour limit and quality-of-care issue).
22 Courtney Humphries, Extended Shifts for Residents Called Risky for Patients,
http://focus.hmsvhavredu/2004/Novl2_2004/sleep-medicine.htmil (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (citing a study
that found "intems made 35.9[/] more medical eros considered serious during the traditional [thirty-hour
shift], including 20.8 [o] more medication ermos and more than five times as many serious diagnostic erors").
23
S eg., Pauline W. Chen, Do More Slp Makejfor BetterDtor?,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, available at
2008 WL 25145629.
24 Parker-Pope, .spra note 16, at A23.
25 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Annual Conference of the Am. Med.
Ass'n. (June 15, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/Remarks-by-thePresident-o-the-Annual-Conference-of-the-American-Medical-Assodation/) (advising the audience that 100,000
lives are unnecessarily lost every year in United States hospitals because of medical enors).
26 The Oprah Waybry V5ou MeeicalMistahkr Dr. OZ Ta&r to Actor Dnni Qaid (ABC television broadcast
Mar. 10, 2009) (storyboard photos and explanatory excerpts available at http://www.oprah.com/dated/
oprahshow/oprahshow-20090219-dennisquaid (drawing the public's attention to a medical enor that nearly
killed actor Dennis Quaid's newbom twins); ser also Kayshan Parsi, To Er Is Honan Undostndng de Dta, 6
VIRTUAL MENTOR, No. 3 (2004), http-I/virtualmentorama-assn.org/2004/03/msocl-0403.html (recognizing
that Oprah Winfiey "devoted a special episode" of the her talk show to apprising the public about the
approximately 100,000 people who die each year because ofmedical eriors).
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patients just like Libby Zion that die each year because of medical errors
linked to sleep-deprived resident physicians, medication overdoses, and
hospital-acquired infections.27
Typically missing from any discussion regarding the problem of sleep
deprivation in residency hospitals is an evaluation of the rights and duties
that emanate from the contractual arrangement between the resident
physician and the residency hospital. Exchanges about social harm reveal a
deeply rooted mental habit that permeates everyday life and engenders a
divergence between the law of contracts and morality. In tragic cases like
that of young Libby Zion, the initial reaction is often to look exclusively to
tort law or, perhaps, criminal law to address the social harm.28 Contract
law, long accepted as the juridical construct aimed at ascribing rights and
duties strictly based on the private ordering of performance and the utility
of efficiency and certainty of transactional outcomes, is seldom, if ever,
considered in this context. Indeed, my research has not revealed any
scholarship that has examined whether contractual formulations may be a
firm vehicle for guarding against societal harm related to performance
under medical-residency agreements.
The purpose of this Article is not to resolve questions regarding the
physiological effect of sleep deprivation on resident physicians from a
medical or scientific perspective. Rather, given the problem of sleep
deprivation, the intent is to identify the exact point at which a hospital's
exercise of discretion exceeds the legal limits established by the law of
contracts. The medical literature, therefore, cannot be wholly detached
from the legal question. The good-faith doctrinal analysis requires some
consideration of what the modem scholarship reflects about this domain.
At first glance, it may appear that the discussion is overly critical of the role
of sleep deprivation in medical-residency programs.
The objective,
nevertheless, is not to render a decisive opinion on medical pedagogies.

Sm R. Monina Klevens et al., Edina&gHalth Ce-Assmiatal Ins

milkas i US Hospids, 122

PUB. HEALTH REP.
160, 164 (2007), available at http://www.cde.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/
hicpac/infectionsdeaths.pdf (finding that "approximately 99,000" people die each year from infections acquired
while hospitalized); Lee, supra note 1, at 162 ("In recent years, there has been an increase in the public's
awareness of medical enrs committed by hospital interns and residents who have been acutely and chronically
sleep-deprived as a result of extremely long work hours.'", Parker-Pope, mpm note 16, at A23 (national
publication drawing the public's attention to the problem); President Barack Obama,.mpra note 25; Tday: Iafic
Job oIly, HeaMi Gare Erpe Dismser die.Nal for Rsmrdainglirsaid Hopitals (NBC television broadcastJuly
12, 2006) (transcript available at 2006 WLNR 12014740) [hereinafter Qumol ] (There are about 100,000
medical [-]enor deaths a year in this country, and many ofthem can be prevented.").
28 See Wicker, srpra note 1, at A17 (indicating that the first two options for holding the physicians
accountable in the Libby Zion matter were criminal sanctions and tort liability).
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The aim, rather, is to highlight the detriment that sleep deprivation causes
to the public and to provide the reader with the opportunity to weigh the
solution advanced here against the plausibility of leaving its legal footing
untouched, which some medical professionals suggest is appropriate, given
resident-hospital labor and pedagogical objectives.29
This Article contends that contract law is in the proper position to
respond to the moral urge to address the problem of sleep deprivation
without encroaching upon the libertarian strictures that prioritize efficiency
and certainty of contractual outcomes over the demands of social welfare.
It illustrates how medical practice has fostered a belief that residency
hospitals have an unbridled discretion to set resident physician duty hours,
which is based on latent individualistic conceptions of justice that cannot be
defended. It asserts that when residency physician agreements are silent on
the question of duty hours or grant the residency hospital absolute
discretion to set duty hours, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing may provide a sufficient jurisprudential basis to trigger a contractual
commitment by the resident hospital to comply with the duty-hour
guidelines enunciated by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education (ACGME).s0
Part I introduces the reader to the resident physician and the ACGME.
Part II explores the problem of sleep deprivation and its human and
economic costs. In so doing, it articulates the competing philosophies that
fuel the sleep-deprivation debate. Part III examines federal and state
legislative efforts to reduce the effects of sleep deprivation in residency
hospitals. Part IV examines competing judicial treatments of medicalresidency agreements and resident-physician employment status. It argues
against the judiciary's penchant for evading good-faith evaluations of the
performance required under medical-residency agreements because of
"medical deferentialism." Part V contends that existing common-law
constructions of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are
properly suited to respond to the societal need to reduce the ill effects of

2

See
&,.mra
note 1, at 186.
The analysis in the Article is limited to the 8747 U.S. medical residency programs sponsored or
accredited by the ACGME, which oversees approximately 110,000 resident physicians. See ACGME, Number
of Accredited Programs for the Cunent Academic Year (2009-2010), http://www.acgmeorg/adspublic/
reports/accreditedprgrams.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (listing the number of accredited programs by
practice specialty). This Article does not address situations in which the residency agreement specifically purports
to grant the residency hospital the right to impose duty hours that exceed the limits promulgated by the
ACGME. Although there may be reason to deny the enforceability of such contracts on public policy grounds,
such an analysis lies outside the scope ofthis Article.
30
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sleep deprivation on patients and resident physicians. In so doing, it
challenges the separatist claim that the law of contracts must insulate itself
from the infusion of moral principle if it is to supply the efficiency drawn
from the certainty of contractual outcomes.
I. THE RESIDENT PHYSICIAN WORK ARRANGEMENT
A. The Resident Physician Work Environment
Resident physicians are "hospital physicians pursuing training in
medical specialties." 3' Despite having completed medical school, resident
physicians are considered "physicians in transition" because they lack the
necessary skills to practice medicine independently.32 Medical-residency
programs are generally three to seven years long, during which time the
resident physician attempts to learn by providing care to patients under the
supervision of a medical faculty member or an attending private
practitioner.33 Among the core goals of the residency program is to provide
"excellent training with an appropriate balance between educational and
clinical areas of instruction."3 4 As the Libby Zion case illustrates, however,
substandard performance by a resident physician can lead to death or
irreparable physical harm to patients, in addition to the traditional
pecuniary losses generally associated with breach-of-contract cases. This
undeniable high risk to the public weighs in favor of strong, effective
monitoring and oversight. Responsibility for this oversight of medical
residency programs falls upon the ACGME.35

31 Klaiman, mpra note 17, at 37 5.

32 Stewart R. Reuter, Iftsnonal liabiy m hsrmial MAb-cal Ewamion- Who Is Liabe for Radat
.Mgogcu?, 15J. LEGAL MED. 485,485(1994).
3 Id at 486-87; Whetsell, supra note 13, at 26-28.
34 Cameron Bnice Dibb, Medical Raidmcy: When Are Pgrmn Adninistrators Liabk?, 36 J.L &
EDUC. 281, 281 (2007). Resident physicians generally enter into "one-year] renewable contracts" with
the residency hospital. Klaiman, supra note 17, at 379. Although the resident physician-residency
hospital relationship is based on contract principles, the negative consequences stemming from poor
performance of the residency agreement transcend private concerns. Id At the expiration of the
contract, the residency hospital has "no legal obligation to renew" the resident physician's contract. Id
In fact, if a residency hospital "decides to discontinue a resident [physician's contract] . . . , it is . .. not

obligated to provide notice to enable the resident to seek training elsewhere." Id
3 Se Reuter,smm note 32, at 486.
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B. The Role of the Accreditation Councilfor GraduateMedical Education
The ACGME establishes, approves, and assesses national standards for
graduate medical educational programs under its sponsorship.36 ACGME
standards prohibit residency hospitals from allowing resident physicians'
weekly duty hours to exceed eighty hours, averaged over a four-week
period.37 Duty hours include program, clinical, and academic activities.38
Duty hours do not include any preparation, reading, or studying performed
outside of the hospital.39
The "ACGME monitors compliance with its standards through
triennial on-site program inspections, through data collection by
anonymous resident surveys, and through a mechanism for accepting
'whistle-blower' complaints by individual residents, albeit not
anonymously."4 0 It also "compiles statistics on the frequency with which
various programs are cited for noncompliance [,] and it publicly
disseminates the results." 4' Critics, however, have found the ACGME's
oversight wanting for two reasons. First, the penalty for violation of the
duty-hour standards is merely probation and possible loss of accreditation. 42
Second, the ACGME does not provide whistle-blower protections for
resident physicians who report program violations. 43 This arrangement
36

Dibb, spra note 34, at 282; see also W. Paige Hren, Is It the Falofan Era or the Bo*inng ofan Error? The

American Medic Association Rnally Approer Work Hour Limitfor Overuwrked and Slp IkprilMadical Reident: Sloud
OSIAL Still Step In?, 23 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L JUDGEs 457, 460 (2003) ("In Febnmary 2003, the ACGME's
final standards were approved and became effective for all accredited United States residency programs on July,
1, 2003.") (footnote omitted); ACGME, The ACGME at a Glance, http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/
newsRoom/newsRmnacGlance.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2009) (explaining the responsibilities undertaken by the
ACGME regaiding medical-residency programs in the United States). To maintain accreditation, a medical
residency program must be in "substantial compliance" with the ACGME standanis, policies, and procedures.
Dibb, supranote 34, at 283.
37
ACGME, Duty Hours Language, http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/dutyHous/dhLang703.pdf
(last visited Sept. 4,2009) [hereinafter Duty Hours Language]; see also Klaiman, supranote 17, at 381 ("Under the
ACGME standards, accredited programs were to impose a weekly duty hour limit of eighty hours (averaged over
each four-week period), with on-call schedules limited to no more frequently than every third night.").
38 Duty Hours Language, supra note 37.
39
d
40
Klaiman,supra note 17, at 381.
41 Id
4
2 Press Release, ACGME, ACGME Duty Hour Standards Now in Effect for All Residency Programs
(July 1, 2003) (available online at http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/newsReleases/newsRel_07_01_0 3 .asp).
43
Robert R. Elder, Note, ExpandedHospital Liability Under the Federal False Claims Act An Unexpected
Solution to the Resident Duty Controversy, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 53, 66 (2008); see also Ciolli, supra note 1, at
207 n.207 (noting that the ACGME's lack of whistle-blower protections possibly prevents residents from
reporting suspected violations); AMSA, The ACGME Regulations vs. Federal Legislation,
http://www.amsa.org/rwh/acgme.cfm (last visited Aug. 17, 2009) [hereinafter ACGME vs. Federal]
(referencing the lack of whistle-blower protection).
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leaves resident physicians in a perpetual state of duress because they are
compelled to choose between jeopardizing their medical education, by
reporting violations, or compromising their own safety and that of their
patients by enduring the potentially high-risk effects of sleep deprivation
brought on by grueling duty-hour demands.44 Therefore, reliance on
resident physicians' reporting as a policing mechanism is undeniably
untrustworthy, causing some commentators to view the ACGME as an
ineffective organization.45
II. CONDITIONS OF WORKER DURESS WITHIN THE MEDICALRESIDENCY PROGRAM HOSPITALS
A. The Sleep-DeprivationFactorin Residency Hospitals
Some physicians contend that sleep deprivation is an unfortunate-butnecessary element of a resident physician's development as a fully skilled,
certified physician.46 Adherents of this view oppose changing the medicalresidency programs to alleviate the effects of sleep deprivation, claiming
"[a] fatigued doctor who is familiar with a case is better than a fresh
physician who doesn't know a thing about the patient."47 Granted,
traditional claims that the continuity of care for patients represents an
important medical imperative have merit.4 8 Nevertheless, recent studies,

4Sw Elder, srra note 43, at 66 ("[Fjew [r]esidents are willing to complain to the ACGME[| or to
anyone else[ when they are required to work irrationally long hours because they fear retaliatory discharge.
Furthermore, those [r]esidents that do raise allegations of regulatory violation, in the hope of improving working
conditions and enhancing the quality of care, risk having their programs tenninated[] therebyD inspiring the ire
of their contemporaries and discrediting the academic reputations of the very institutions and superiors to which
they are looking for career advancement") (footnote omitted); ACGME vs. Federal, mpra note 43 ("The penalty
for violating the regulations is loss of accreditation-presenting an unfair dilemma for residents who, in addition
to the personal risks involved, must choose to report violations at the risk of losing accreditation for the entire
program.").
45
Eg, Dori Pag6 Antonetti, A Dse of Their Oun Mliie W/I the FakralGwonmat Must Fa-e Heak
Wding Cndtsfor MdnadReidets and How R form fould BeAccaoplidh 51 CATH. U. L REV. 875, 892 n.91
(2002), Elder, .wpra note 43, at 64; sw also ACGME vs. Federal, sipra note 43 (noting "serious flaws" with the
ACGME duty-hour regulations)
nd Resider Call Schakder, 46
4 See Lee, .wpra note 1, at 185 (citing Robert E. Condon, Skla ,kmar ion
CURRENT SURGERY 361, 364 (1989)).
47
Tumer, srpra note 19; Ieora I. Horwitz et al., Granger in Ouknrer rIntnalMalicme InparistsAf*r
Wo,*-Haur RquAzions, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1, 1 (2007), available at http://www.annalsorg/cgi/
reprint/0000605-200707170-00163vl.pdf (indicating the ACGME duty-hour regulations may mitigate fatigue
but also cause "increased handoffs" of patients from physician to physician, which can harn patient care).
4 S* ag., Whetsell, srpra note 13, at 43-44 (noting the "continuity argument": that medical mistakes
increase when patient hand-offs occur at shift changes, due to lack of adequate communication between the
physicians, and also that residents miss out on following their patients "at every critical stage" of the hospital stay).
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advances in technology, and an increased awareness of the effects of sleep
deprivation have thoroughly discredited the notion that imposing harsh
duty-hour demands upon resident physicians will result in better care for
patients. 49
It is undeniable that technological advances, improved
supervision, and increased rest periods have consistently resulted in superior
patient care.50 Medical studies have failed to reveal any deterioration in
patient care for residency hospitals that have implemented and complied
with the ACGME regulations. 5 ' Still, some medical professionals object to
change because there is no clear "clinical evidence to tie physician fatigue to
medical errors,"52 arguing that reduced hours would compromise the
resident education, quality of health care, or the financial solvency of the
residency hospital.53
Though some assertions supporting the role of sleep deprivation may
appear legitimate, they are often underlain by attitudinal mischief and oldguard philosophy, such as "we made it through. So should you." 54 Some
supervising physicians view the resident physician's grueling work
conditions as a necessary rite of passage that every resident physician must
endure in order to become a certified physician.5 5 For many, the solution is
simply for resident physicians to "learn to 'subordinate their needs for sleep
and food to the unpredictable and often consuming demands of patient
care."' 56 In fact, some supervising physicians liken themselves to seasoned
soldiers, Marines, or Navy Seals57 and liken resident physicians to "military

49 S eg., id at 44-45.
50 See Humphries, supra note 22 (discussing a study conducted at Brigham and Women's
Hospital, called the "Landrigan study," which "pointed out that a computerized patient sign-off system
... reduced the errors caused by cross-coverage" and found that "even with more patient handoffs,
fewer errors occurred when interns were better rested [").
51 Howitz, supra note 47, at 6.
52 Turner, .spranote 19.
5 See Adam E. Block & Douglas M. Norton, Nurse Labor Effects of Residency Work Hour Limits, 26
NURSING EcON. 368, 368 (2008), availableat 2008 WLNR 25970886 (stating that "there was substantial
pushback" to work hour restrictions because of concerns regarding medical education, quality of care,
and "fiscal consequences of the work-hour limits").
54
Lighteig e Lod, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Mar. 13, 2005, Sunday Magazine, at 15, available
at2005 WLNR 3930447.
55
Pomeoy, supranote 20, at 38-39.
56
Ciolli, supra note 1, at 182 (quoting Sandra G. Boodman, Waking Up to tie APblorn ofFa~geAmong
Maeallatems,LA. TIMEs, Apr. 16,2001, Health, at SI, availableat2001 WLNR 10573165).
57 See Boodman, supra note 56 ("[The ability to 'handle it' is a core value in medicine, which is. . . 'a
"Rght Sf" kind of envimnment'--a culture shared by astronauts, pilots, Navy Seals and other highly trained
elite groups. 'Right Stuff cultures prize exceptionally hard work, toughness, intelligence, self-sufficiencyL] and a
refusal to complain. Residents at Johns Hopkins are even called 'Osler marines' after William Osler, the
legendary physician whose [nineteenth] century vision that young doctors would best learn to take care of
patients by living on the wards and apprenticing themselves to experienced doctors became the modem
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recruits,"58 identifying themselves as "tough and 'hardened[,]"
array of measures to discipline residents deemed weak.60

[Vol. 48:265
59

using an

Egotism among physicians plays an undeniable role in the process.
While supervising physicians liken themselves to the military elite,6 '
evidence indicates that surgeons perceive themselves as almost godlike,
viewing their physiological abilities to be far superior than that of physicians
in other medical disciplines and, perhaps, all other human beings. 62
Richard Reiling, former residency director and former representative of the
American College of Surgeons at the American Medical Association, flatly
rejects sleep-deprivation research and dismisses complaints about fatigue as
"'whining[,]"' 63 suggesting surgeons "'are built differently' and learn to
become impervious to exhaustion." 64 These God complex or superhuman
attitudes appear misplaced, given the vast degree of scholarship highlighting
the deleterious effects of sleep deprivation recognized by noted
professionals, 65 including the military elite.66 As illustrated in the next
residency. 'These are smart people, very competitive and driven in a high-stess environment, which requires a
VieRidmce, COMMHTEE OF
certain attitude to get through .... "); so aso Simon Ahtaridis, When PHysii gnore
INTERNs AND RESIE'Ie NEWS (CIR, natl affiliate of SEIU, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2006, at 2, availabe at
http://www.ciseiu.org/asses/assetcontent/a96df79-53ca-4708a8a-7f3002566263/546bfa9e-94e2-495f9d30-54cc81f55e47/a5b8eO6l-97c0-4fe6-a66b64a88792b604/l/CIR%20News-9-06.pdf
("[The medical
profession's] culture supports the view that [physicians] are indestructible individuals, immune to the effects of
illness and fatigue.. . . Those who claim that long shifts are bad for patient care are thought to be weak,
undedicated, or selfish.").
58 Peter Gott, Long Sas Hot Paiw Gre, STUART NEWS (Ha.), Feb. 26, 1998, at D3, available at 1998
WLNR 5822505.
59
1d
60 See M.H. Klaiman, Medical Edcation'sDirtiest Secret, THE HUMANIST, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 3031 ("[The ugliest feature of medical education is the draconian methods that medical educators use in
disciplining residents. Medical school administrators have been functionally free to resort to actionable
or illegal acts such as defamation or physical mistreatment. The latter can include increasing the
trainee's workload, denying leave for illness and even corporal punishment.... Denial of sick leave
(especially extended sick leave), for example, is common.... Hospital administrators engage in abusive
discipline because they can. The perpetrators must account to no one and nothing in the typical
contract signed by a doctor joining a medical residency places limits on her or his superiors' disciplinary
prerogatives."); seealso Boodman, supra note 56 (reporting remarks by Bertrand M. Bell, a professor of
medicine at Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York, who said that resident physicians are
"'taught to hide what [they] don't know'). According to Bell, the idea is that the only way the resident
is going to remember how to do something right "'is to make a mistake and then learn from it."' Id As
a result of such cultural norms, "'[m]istakes by interns and residents kill more people than medication
errors'...." Id
61 SeeBoodman, spr note 56.
62
Whetsell, soa note 13, at 46 n.125.
6
3 Id
6 Id; ser ao Lindsay Evans, RulataryaidLL isatierAitnprat Limihng Makcal Resida Wors Hows, 23J.
LEGAL MED. 251, 256 (2002) (reiterating same).
65
S% eg., Humphries, .spra note 22 (citing a study that found "intems made 35.9[%] more medical
erors considered serious during the traditional [thirty-hour shift], including 20.8[%] more medication errors and
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section, the scientific scholarship reveals an undeniable and unforgiving
reality regarding sleep deprivation in the resident-physician work
environment and prompts questions regarding the ethics and judgment of
the practices employed by some residency hospitals.
B. The Link Between Sleep Deprivationand Harm to the Resident Physician
Contrary to the assertions made by some supervising physicians and
regardless of a resident physician's effort and dedication, no human being
can overcome the physiological need for sleep. 67 The judiciary and the
medical profession alike have recognized the wide body of scholarship
indicating that human beings have a biological need for sleep. 68 Few would
deny that sleep deprivation results in decreased "judgment, vigilance, mood,
motor coordination, cognitive skills, reaction time, and even the ability to
recognize error."69 Whether a person forgoes sleep for twenty-four
consecutive hours or receives inadequate sleep over an extended period,
"the harmful impact on cognitive performance is similar."70 In addition to
cognitive dysfunctions, resident physicians frequently "feel they are living in
a kind of submarine of anguish that no one 'out there' can understand,"71
which reduces their chances of maintaining healthy personal relationships.
This stress and isolation consequently leads to high rates of divorce,
emotional difficulties, alcoholism, anger, depression, drug abuse, suicide,
pregnancy complications, or some combination of these occurrences.7 2 The
more than five times as many serious diagnostic errors").
66 According to a 2008 report commissioned by the Pentagon's Office of Defense Research and
Engineering, the "most immediate human perfomance factor in military effectiveness is degradation of
performance" due to sleep deprivation. E. WILUAMS ET AL, HUMAN PERFORMANCE 1 (2008), avilable at
http://fas.org/ip/agency/dod/jason/human.pdf. The report found that "sleep deprivation is known to have
significantly harmful impact on physical performance, alertness, and the ability to perform complex cognitive
tasks." Id at 20. Therefore, battlefield commanders should "weigh carefully the negative impact" of sleep
deprivation on their forces. Id Contrary to the attitudes of many physicians likening themselves to soldiers, the
report indicated that sleep deprivation caused a dramatic decrease in the "cognitive function, including vigilance,
memory, reaction time and reasoning" of soldiers "in U.S. Army elite units during a combat simulation field
exercise." Id at 21. Se aLt ScienceDaily.com, Sleep Deprivation Affects Moral Judgment, Study Finds,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/03/070301081831.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2009) (highlighting a
study conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research that found sleep deprivation affects moral
judgment).
67 Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944,953-55 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
68 Id (citing medical studies and textbooks in finding that human beings do indeed need sleep).
69
Whetsell, supra note 13, at 40.
70
Andrew W. Gefl, Note, lyivg to St*p Us FatedrlIglatim and Tort Law to Cre the Efit ofFatigue in
MicalResdoup Agrr, I1J.L &POL'Y 645,649-50 (2003).
71 Ethan Brmner, 7he Foot Soldiers ofMedicine, BOSTON GLOBE,July 6, 1986, Sunday Magazine, at 16,
availableat 1986 WLNR 274384.
72 See Evans, supra note 64, at 255 (citing depression and pregnancy complications); Lucy M.
Osborn et al., Outcome of PrgnanciesFxperienced During Residency, 31 J. FAM. PRAC. 618 (1990), available at
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debilitating effects of sleep deprivation are, in fact, comparable to the effects
of alcohol use.73 Studies have shown that staying awake for nineteen to
twenty-eight hours impairs physiological performance to the same degree as
having a .10% blood alcohol level, which is well above the legal limit.74
C. Sleep Deprivation and PatientHarm
Despite protestations that there is no "rigorous scientific evidence" that
links sleep deprivation and patient harm,75 strong medical evidence now
explains the link between resident-physician sleep deprivation and medical
error.76 A March 2008 study by researchers at Duke University revealed
for the "first time" that sleep deprivation substantially decreases a healthy
individual's brain functioning, including those areas that make sense of
visual perceptions.7 7 According to Dr. Michael Chee, 78 humans "can't
effectively memorize or process what [they] see if [the] brain isn't capturing
that information." 79
Dr. Chee's findings are consistent with the personal claims of resident
physicians who contend that their fatigue-related medical errors,80 have led

1990 WLNR 4494677 (discussing pregnancy complications among female residents but noting the issue
"needs further investigation"); Raymond C. Lackore, Editorial, Exhausted Doctors in Training Hazardous,
VIRGINIA-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Dec. 3, 1990, at A8, available at 1990 WLNR 1543654
(citing "[d] rug dependence, alcoholism, divorce, and suicide"); seealso Joyce Allman, Bearing the Burden or
Baring the Soul Physicians' Self-Disclosure and Boundary Management Regarding Medical Mistakes, 10 HEALTH
COMM. 175, 177 (1998) (describing how resident physicians are "precluded" from discussing their
medical errors for "three reasons: risk management discourages it, public law inhibits it, and the medical
culture denies it"). This workplace arrangement often leads to "self-imposed professional isolation,
feelings of remorse, anger at self, inadequacy, guilt, and fear of repercussions." Id
73
Joshua D. Levine, Note, A Road to Inustice Pmed with Good Intentons Me's Mguid CackdoUm on
Losy Diving, 56 HASTINGS LJ. 1297, 1301 (2005).
74 Whetsell, supra note 13, at 41; seeabo Levine, .spra note 73, at 1301 (citing study that indicated
individuals "awake for twenty-four hours are as impaired as someone iith a blood-alcohol level of. 10%"). Not
surprisingly, sleep deprivation presents a high risk of exposure to vehicular harm for resident physicians. NAILAH
THOMPSON, DRIVING WHILE DROWSY: THE THREAT TO RESIDENT PHYSIcIANs & PUBLIc SAFETY 4 (2008),
avaiable at http://www.cieiorg/assets/assetcontent/a96dfl79-53ca4706-aBa-7f3002566263/546bfa9e94e2-495f-9d30-54cc81f55e47/df3512e6-27d6-431d-9a95-6ad2e8bf4al6/1/IOMThompsontestimony030408.pdf
75
Whesel, supra note 13, at 42.
76
S SlWpee
privagion AfectsAbi4 to Make Smse ofWhat We S, DRUG WK.,June 6, 2008, at 136, available
at 2008 WLNR 10145244 [hereinafter, DRUG WKC] (discussing neuroscience study of effects of sleep
deprivation).
77

Id

78 Lead author and professor at the Neurmbehavioral Disorders Pmgram at Duke-NUS Graduate
Medical School Singapore.
7 DRUG WK., smpra note 76, at 136.
80
Whetsellsu=pra note 13, at 38.
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to patient physical discomfort, emotional distress, or death. 8 ' Several
incidents involving resident-physician fatigue have drawn national attention
because they reveal life-threatening errors.82 One resident physician fell
asleep with surgical equipment in hand during surgery,83 another neglected
to examine test results that revealed a high probability of patient death from
arrhythmia,84 and another nearly administered a lethal dose of medication
to a patient.85
Ironically, the approximate number of resident physicians in the United
States, 106,000,86 corresponds with the approximate number of patient
Indeed, within the medical
deaths from medical errors, 100,000.87
profession, it is a matter of common "folklore" that more patients die during
July, when the inexperienced resident physicians begin their residency
programs.88 Equally telling is a California study indicating that babies born
late at night, when resident physicians have almost sole responsibility for
providing care, are 16% more likely to die than those born during the day.89
While the medical profession's practice of having medical students
perform pelvic exams on anesthetized women without their consent

81 Id; see als Tara Abraham et al., Are Residt Work-Hour limitaton Baufcialto die TrmonaIsfemon, AM.
SURGEON, Jan. 1, 2006, at 35, azwilable at 2006 WLNR 2259433 (stating "more than [one] million patient
injuries and up to 98,000 patient deaths can be attributed to medical errors" in which fatigue can play a
significant role); Charles Czeisler, It's Tine to Refotm Work Hs for Reddmi Pipaicians, SCIENCE NEws, 2009
WLNR 21655909, 36 (Oct. 24, 2009) (stating that "[o]ne in 20 [resident physicians] admitted a fatigue-related
mistake that resulted in a patient's death").
82 Antonetti, supra note 45, at 880 n.21 (citing Boodman, supra note 56).
83 Boodman, supranote 56.
84
Id
85
Id
8
6 AAMC, About the AAMC, http://www.aamc.org/about/stathtm (lastvisited Sept. 7, 2009).
87 See Comolo, supm note 27 (mentioning that there are about 100,000 medical deaths a year in the
United States).
88 E-mail frm Mimi Klaiman to Brandy Baker (Aug. 28, 2008, 12:23:09 CST) (on file with author); .se
alsoJohn langone, Books oHalls; SsovAwig die Hakg Droinga Haspital&ay, N.Y. TIMS, 2004 WLNR 5451924
(Febmary 17, 2004) ("Dr. Sherer also suggests avoiding elective surgery in July because of the 'JulySyndrome.'
Then, those doctors who have finished training are replaced by 'fresh faces.' Ifyou find yourself in a hospital in
July, he writes, 'and see a young person hovering over you nervously with a needle, you are hereby warned that
you, too, could be in for the pincushion treatment"); Adam Cresswell, '%l&g Seaas"A Dkagosms Time to Be in
Wards, AUSTRAHAN, 2009 WLNR 20269280 (October 15, 2009) (reporting on "new research from Australia"
that proves that "the start of the academic year," the "August killing Season" in British hospitals, and the 'July
Syndrome" in U.S. hospitals, is "the most dangerous time to be admitted to hospital, because of the influx of
[resident physicians].").
89
S Hemandez v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 971, 978 (N.J. 1997) (recognizing that resident physicians
are typically responsible for the night shift at hospitals); Max Alexander, Ai.gt gaf Aibnmze, READER's DIGEST,
June 2007, at 113, 114, aviable at http://www.rd.com/living-healthy/night-hift-nightmae/article38715.html
(highlighting a 2005 study in Califonia of3.3 million child births).
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garnered national attention,9 0 not enough has been reported or done
regarding the use of resident physicians to perform critical medical
procedures and the degree of risk patients unknowingly assume when they
seek health care. It comes as no surprise that, according to a study
conducted by the National Sleep Foundation, the public overwhelmingly
favors duty-hour reductions.9 1 Of those polled, 86% "indicated that they
would feel anxious about their safety" if they knew that their physician had
been working for "twenty-four consecutive hours," and "[70%] reported
that they would request another doctor."9 2
The economic and human costs of medical errors are as alarming as the
reasoning behind them. Medicare reportedly disburses about $8 billion a
year to residency hospitals for resident-physician clinical training and
education.93 However, patient-safety incidents cost the federal Medicare
program $8.8 billion and resulted in 238,337 potentially preventable deaths
between 2004 and 2006.94 Considering that the social-science value of life
estimates "'are clustered in the $4 million to $10 million range, with an
average value of life in the vicinity of $7 million[,] "'9 the cost of
preventable deaths from medical errors arguably exceeds $7 trillion a year.
In short, the harmful economic, physiological, and moral reality of sleep
deprivation weighs in favor of strong legislative action.

90 Se, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Autonomy Suspended Using Female Patientsto Teach Intimate Exas
Without Their Knowledge or Consent, 8J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 240, 240-42 (2005).
91
Joseph H. King, The Standed ofCar ForReidatsand OdrMald &hool Gradratesin Traimg, 55 AM. U.
L REv. 683, 740 n.233 (2006).
92
Id
3 Lee, supra note 1, at 207; cf Boodman, supra note 56 ("The federal government pays training
programs about $100,000 per resident annually, while most [residents] earn between $26,000 and
$50,000, depending on specialty and experience.").
9 ScienceDaily, Medical Erors Cost US $8.8 Billion, Result in 238,337 Potential Preventable Deaths,
Study Shows, SCIENCEDAILY.COM, Apr. 8, 2008, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/
080408085458.htm.
9 Frank Cross & Charles Silver, In Teas, Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L REV. 1875, 1885 (2006); see
also Associated Press, How to Value Lafe? EPA Devalues Its Ertimae, MSNBC.coM, July 10, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25626294/ (highlighting the EPA's decision to devalue its estimate of a
statistical life by $900,000).
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III. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES TO PROTECT RESIDENT PHYSICIANS
AND PATIENTS

A. FederalRegulatoy Efforts
Despite the efforts of some of the nation's most influential political
figures, including Bill and Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama, 96
federal efforts to reduce medical errors have been largely unsuccessful. 97
Attempts to combat the problem of resident-physician sleep deprivation are
hampered by gaps that exist in federal regulatory paradigms and
unsuccessful efforts to fill those gaps. For instance, the chief legal
mechanism designed to protect employees from oppressive working
conditions, facilitated by the unequal bargaining power between employers
and employees, is the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).98 One intended
purpose of the FLSA is to regulate labor hours.99 However, the Act
specifically excludes resident physicians from its protections.oo A review of
the congressional discussions surrounding the enactment of the FLSA fails
to reveal a rationale for this exclusion. 0 1 Nonetheless, it is reasonably
apparent that a lack of federal protection perpetuates the continuation of
oppressive duty-hour demands on resident physicians. 0 2 Ostensibly aware
of the need to fill the gap in legislative coverage regarding resident
physicians' work hours-as a means to protect residents and the patients
they service-federal legislators attempted to address the safety problem

9 Se Robert Pear, A Ginan Onr Ses to Raice Maeka Enrs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at Al
(reporting then-President Bill Clinton's attempt to reduce medical eors); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert
Pear, Obara Opem to Reirag In Maica Suits, N.Y. TIMES,June 15, 2009, at Al (reporting then-Senators Barack
Obama and Hillary Clinton's proposal ofa bill to reduce medical erors).
97 S* eg., National Medical Ermr Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Act, S. 1784, 109th Cong.
(2005). The National MEDiC Act, sponsored by then-Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, sought "to
promote a culture of safety . . . ." Id The bill, however, never became law before the expiration of the 109th
Congress.
98
Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Ned, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945); McComb v. Homeworkers' Handicraft
Coop., 176 F.2d 633, 636 (4th Cir. 1949); Peter D. DeChiara, Rdanking Vie Maageial-PofessionalEVWnpda ofode
FairLabor &mdardsAct, 43 AM. U. L REV. 139, 144-45 (1993) (reasoning that the philosophical underpinnings of
the FLSA are that regulation would increase employee welfare, productivity, and encourage a healthy society).
9 Ban'entine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981).
10 Fair Labor Standads Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(aX) (2006); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.304(c) (2009)
("Employees engaged in internship or resident programs, whether or not licensed to practice prior to
commencement of the program, qualify as exempt professionals if they enter such internship or resident
programs after the earning of the appropriate degree required for the general practice of their profession.").
I0 1Joint
HarigBfre de S mm on EAucir and LaborandH Ca=on. on Laboran S 2475 amd H.R 7200,
75th Cong. 45 (1937).
102 Kaiulani Eileen Sumi Kidani, Comment, JapanereCorporate Wanors in Roruit ofa Leal Ran4d. 7he
Soy ofKarada, or "thzdifran Otowrk"imjan, 21 U. HAW. L REV. 169,198 (1999).
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with the Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001,103 the
Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2002,10 and the Patient
and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2005 (PPSPA).105 Unlike the
ACGME standards, the PPSPA would have allowed resident physicians to
file anonymous complaints, imposed financial rather than accreditation
penalties on residency hospitals found noncompliant, and provided whistleblower protection to resident physicians.10 6 However, the Association of
American Medical Colleges did not support the measures. 07 Accordingly,
the PPSPA never became law. 08
B. State Regulatoy Efforts
There appears to be wide concurrence among commentators that there
is virtually no state regulation of resident physician duty hours. 09 After the
death of Libby Zion, New York became the first state or territory to enact
regulations restricting resident work hours in 1989,110 followed by legislative
efforts in Massachusetts,"' Delaware," 2 Puerto Rico," 3 Pennsylvania,"l 4
and New Jersey.115 The states and territories that have enacted legislation
have provisions that maintain characteristics similar to the ACGME
10 3 H.R. 3236, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by RepresentativeJohn Conyers in November 2001); as
abo Lee, supranote 1,at 196 (reiterating same).
104 S. 2614, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by SenatorJon Corzine inJune 2002); se also Lee, supra
note 1,at 196 (reiterating same).
10 5
H.R. 1228, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced by RepresentativeJohn Conyers in March 2005).
I0 6 S, id § 3(c).
107 AAMC, Conyers Reintroduces Resident Hours Legislation, http://www.aamc.org/advocacy/
library/washhigh/2005/040105/starthtm#2 qastvisited Sept. 7,2009).
10 8
Se .FR.1228.
109 Se Evans, spom note 64, at 259 (discussing state efforts to regulate); Lee, supra note 1, at 189, 207
(same); Laura Lin & Bryan A Liang, Rfomning Roducy: Modenitng ReidEt E~cadon and Tranig to PIomote Quaey
andSafey in Harliare,38J. HEALTH L 203, 239-40 (2005) (same); Whetsell, .upra note 13, at 55 (same).
I10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, §405.4 (2009), Press Release, N.Y. Dep't of Health, State
Health Dep't Reports That Majority of Hospitals in N.Y. Are Complying with Resident Working Hour Law
(Apr. 19, 2006) (available online at http://www.health.state.ny.us/press/releases/2006/2006-04-19_resident
workinghourhtm);
AMSA,
The
Resident
Work
Hour
Issue:
State
Efforts,
http://www.amsa.org/rwh/efforts.cfm (last visited Sept. 11, 2009) [hereinafter State Efforts]. The New York
regulations were called the "Bell Regulations' and were passed in 1989. Id
Ill Eg., Senate No. 1247, 185th Sess. Mass. 2007).
112 S.B. 133, 142nd Sess. (Del. 2003); see aoState Efforts, supm note I10 (indicating the name ofthe bill).
113 H.B. 390, 14th Leg., 4th Sess. (P.R. 2003); see also AMSA, Comparison of State and Puerto
Rican Legislation, http://www.amsa.org/rwh/compare-pr.cfm (last visited Sept. 11, 2009) [hereinafter
Comparison]; State Efforts, supra note I10.
114 S.B. 1224, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); see aLo State Efforts, stpra note 110 (pnviding
background information).
15 S. 808, 2006-2007 Reg. Sess. (NJ. 2006); se aLso Comparison, sup note 113 (showing chart of states
that have pursued legislative efforts to enact regulations).
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standards but offer resident physicians whistle-blower protection and
establish better enforcement safeguards." 6 While efforts to establish
regulation of resident physician duty hours in some states may increase,
given the strong warnings enunciated in the December 2008 Institute of
Medicine (IOM) report,"7 few states have yet to address the problem of
sleep deprivation in medical residency programs." 8 Accordingly, the vast
majority of patients and resident physicians continue to be at risk because of
the debilitating effects of sleep deprivation caused by oppressive duty-hour
demands.
IV. THE ROLE OF THEJUDICIARY IN PROTECTING RESIDENT
PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS

Every federal circuit court that has addressed the question of whether
sleep qualifies as a major life activity, sufficient to evoke federal legislative
protections," 9 has answered in the affirmative.120 In Desmond v. Mukasey, the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recognized that sleep is
more central to the life process than "seeing, hearing, and speaking, for one
can survive without engaging in these activities, but not without
sleeping."'21 Wide acceptance of the vital role of sleep in facilitating the
most basic life activities has led some courts to hold employers liable to third
parties for the actions of their obviously fatigued employees, under tort law,
when the sleep deprivation arises out of activity over which the employer
exercised control.122 Efforts to hold residency hospitals accountable for the
harm suffered by resident physicians as a result of work-induced sleep

116 Se Comparison, supm note 113.
117 INsT. OF MED., RESIDENr DuIy HOURS: ENHANCING SLEEP, SuPERvisioN, AND SAFETY
(2008),
auaiableathttp://books.nap.edu/openbookphp?recorLid=12508&page=R1.
18 State Efforts, supra note I10.
119 For example, this includes the protections enunciated under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, as amended. Se 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (2006).
120 Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944,953-54 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
121 Id at 955.
122 SeeFaverty v. McDonald's Rests. of Or., Inc., 892 P.2d 703, 709 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
employer liable after allowing an employee to drive home after working three shifts in a twenty-four-hour period)
Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 568-69 (W. Va. 1983) (holding employer could be held liable for
requiring its employee to work such long hours "and sending him out on the highway in such an exhausted
condition"). Bt seeBehrens v. Harrah's ll. Corp., 852 N.E.2d 553, 556 (Il. App. Ct. 2006) (asserting that
employers cannot be held liable for accidents caused by fatigued employees while driving home, on ground that
"employees are in the best position to determine whether they are sufficiently rested to drive home safeW;
Brewster v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. hike's Med. Ctr., 836 N.E.2d 635, 636 (Il. App. CIL 2005) (holding that
hospital did not owe a duty to victim killed by accident caused by medical resident who fdl asleep behind the
wheel after working a thirty-six-hour shift on the ground that the medical resident was off-duty).
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deprivation, for which residency hospitals exercise control, face
considerable challenge because of the judiciary's reluctance to intercede on
behalf of resident physicians.
A. Medical Deferentialism
Medical deferentialism has led to an impracticable, if not myth-based,
conception of the resident physician-residency hospital relationship that
underlies the reluctance of some courts to enforce or define minimal
standards of decency necessary to safeguard resident physicians and patients
for at least two reasons. First, some courts do not recognize resident
Second, the judiciary has "traditionally
physicians as employees.123
accorded great deference" to the decisions of residency-hospital officials
regarding their evaluation and treatment of resident physicians. 24 Some
courts are unwilling even to question the decisions of residency-hospital
officials on the ground that it would be inappropriate for a court to
substitute its judgment for that of hospital officials. 25 This reasoning is
based on a claim that residency hospitals, as academic institutions, are in
the best position to decide academic matters, rather than the judiciary.126
For example, in Hernandez v. Overlook Hospital, the court reasoned that a
decision to dismiss a resident physician from the residency program was
solely up to the hospital.127 The Hernandez court believed that judicial
intervention would hinder academic freedom by infringing upon the
residency hospital's ability to set and enforce performance levels.128 It
wished to avoid forcing supervising physicians to act like judges rather than
academics, thereby hampering candid evaluations of resident physicians for
fear ofjudicial scrutiny.129
Prior to the Hernandez court's use of the medical-deference approach,
the Fifth Circuit, in Davis v. Mann, endorsed medical deferentialism on the
ground that the main purpose of a residency program is to provide
academic training and professional certification. 3 0 In the minds of the

123 S*; eg., Davisv. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 974 (5th Cir. 1989).
124 Navato v. Sletten, 560 F.2d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1977).
125 Garibaldiv. Anolebaum, 742 N.E.2d 279, 286 (llL 2000).
126 Colleen F. Walsh, A Hospital Resident Is Not Entitled to Counsel During a Resideny Tennmination
Proceeding and Is Not Entitled to Have the Proceeding Transcibed-Hemandez v. Overlook Hosp., 27 SETON
HALL L REv. 1733, 1735-36 (1997).
127 692 A.2d 971, 975 (NJ. 1997).
128 Id at 975-76.
129
Id at 976.
130 882 F.2d 967, 974 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Davis court, the fact that residency physicians are compensated for their
labor is not enough to overcome the program's academic characteristic and
justify the court's interference with what it perceives to be a pedagogical
process.' 3 However, recognizing a resident physician's contractual right to
appropriate duty-hour standards and adequate safeguards would not
constitute judicial interference, as medical deferentialists might have us
believe, because courts have an obligation to (1) hear and decide cases that
meet its jurisdictional and procedural requirements, particularly when the
legislature has snubbed its constitutional authority, 3 2 and (2) balance
"privacy rights against the state's legitimate interest in protecting the
public's health, safety, welfare, and morals." 33 Therefore, courts have a
fundamental obligation to act on behalf of resident physicians and patients
for at least several reasons. First, the lack of legal intervention has
perpetuated a culture wherein medical-residency administrators and
supervising physicians freely abuse resident physicians and impose excessive
labor requirements. 34 Despite the growing number of studies highlighting
the adverse effects of sleep deprivation on resident physicians and patients
due to medical errors, the ACGME reported an increase in the number of
noncompliant residency hospitals from 2006 to 2007.135
Second, the underlying justification for the medical-deference
approach-that the primary purpose of the residency is to educate-is at
odds with the stances taken by medical professionals in the best position to
know the nuances of residency programs. In response to claims that
resident physicians are primarily students, the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC) pointed out that resident physicians spend 80%
of their time "'in direct patient care activities." 3 6 The substantial amount

131 Id; se also Phila. Ass'n of Intems and Residents v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 369 A.2d 711, 714
(1976) (deciding that resident physicians should be viewed as students); St. Clare's Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229
N.LR.B. 1000, 1003 (1977) (reasoning that resident physicians are "primarily students"' as opposed to
employees because they are providing services as part of their educational development); Cedars-Sinai Med Ctr.,
223 N.LR.B. 251, 253 (1976) (reasoning that hospitals do not provide residency programs for the purpose of
meeting staffing requirements but rather to allow students to develop the clinical skills necessary to practice
medicine).
132 EDWARD KEYNES & RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT VS. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING,
AND ABORTION 96 (1989).

133 Id at 250.
134 Klaiman, supra note 17, at 375.
135 ACGME, THE ACGME's APPROACH TO LIMIT REsIDENT DUTY HOURS 2006-07: A
SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS FOR THE FOURTH YEAR UNDER THE COMMON REQUIREMENTS 1-2
(2007), available
at http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/dutyHours/dh achieveSum0607.pdf.
136
Jack E. Kams, The Jatonal Labor Relaon Board Rdfwe Wadal
' Under dze Wgni Act
RyardingResdentsandhtmu, Therely Openngt
q
eDor to Uzionitainand Collectmu
Ba
Dwni
ands, 77 N.D. L REV.
53,64 (2001) (quoting Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.LR.B. 251,256 (1976)).
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of time resident physicians spend with patients is consistent with the
ACGME's position that one of the core goals of the residency program is to
provide "safe and effective patient care."137
Third, it cannot be denied that there are few legal relationships in
which one party (the resident physician) places more reliance upon the
other (residency hospital), is more dependent upon the other, is more
vulnerable to abuse by the other, or is more tasked by the other to perform
vital services for a third party (patient) than that between the resident
physician and residency hospital.138 Therefore, there is a huge disparity in
bargaining power between the resident physician and the residency
hospital. As one justice put it, "[t]he hospital has virtually limitless
resources-including administrators, physicians, and lawyers-at its
disposal[,]" whereas "[t]he resident stands alone." 3 9
The resident
physician's status relative to the residency hospital is one of dependence and
lowliness.
Finally, resident physicians perform critical tasks in exchange for
compensation and training but lack a safe work environment and
opportunity to provide proper patient care because of enforced disruption
of the medical resident's ability to function and learn due to sleep
deprivation.140 Residency hospitals that require resident physicians to work
past their physiological limits are not only preventing the resident physicians
from learning they are also exposing the resident physician and patients to
great risk. Succinctly put, the reluctance of some courts to protect patients
and resident physicians from the harmful working conditions to which they
are subjected in the name of medical deferentialism leaves the resident
physician in a perpetual state of worker's duress and virtually exempt from
judicial protection. This is a dangerous arrangement for a society in which
there is strong reliance on resident-physician labor. It comes as no surprise
that some courts have declined to adopt medical deferentialism.14 1

137 ACGME, ACGME Highlights Its Standards on Resident Duty Hours-May 2001,
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/positionpapers/pp-oshaResponse.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
138 See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 414-15 (Cal. 1988) (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting) (making the same claim with respect to the employee-employer relationship).
139 Hemandez v. Ovelook Hosp., 692 A.2d 971,979 (NJ. 1997) (PollockJ., dissenting).
140 See S4 Bram Cwmras Sag&dm Doing Waking Hours Wrkm LoirW Skp, OBESnY, FnNESS &
WEUNESS WL, Feb. 9, 2008, at 3906, milabl at 2008 WLNR 1858039 (citing research by the University of
Wisconsin indicating that lack ofsleep affects the brain's ability to lean).
141
Nrt IV.B
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B. Medical Realism
Some courts have adopted a view stemming from medical realism,
which recognizes the educational component of the residency as
subordinate to the critical medical services resident physicians provide for
patients-and, by extension, for society in general.142 Medical realists
embrace the reality that resident physicians are often the only physicians
"present in the hospital during evening hours, on weekends, and on
holidays." 4 3 "To a patient or visitor at a hospital, a resident in his or her
white coat is indistinguishable from any other physician."l44 "In many
hospitals, they respond to patient emergencies[,] such as cardiac arrest,
arrhythmia, and bleeding." 45 They also provide direct patient care, handle
childbirths, run respirators, draw blood, and place catheters.146 Resident
physicians sometimes change medications, adjust intravenous fluids, and
enter orders on patient charts that significantly affect patient care.14 7
Although these procedures are subject to examination by an attending
physician and medical faculty, such a review typically occurs after the
resident physician has already performed the tasks.'4
In addition to receiving compensation (albeit minimal) for these
services, resident physicians pay federal and state taxes, make Social
Security contributions, and receive benefits, such as health insurance,
vacations, and sick leave. 4 9 Residency hospitals are certainly responsible
for resident physicians' negligence while on duty. 5 0 Moreover, American
Medical Association guidelines refer to residency contracts as "employment
agreements."'51 In keeping with these medical realities, some courts have
recognized that the employment facet of the medical-residency program is
an "integral and mandatory component[,] . . . rather than an incidental

feature[]" of the medical residency experience. 5 2 For instance, the United

14 2

Se Regents ofUniv. ofCal. v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 715 P.2d 590,605 (Cal. 1986).
14 3 Hmmde, 692 A.2d at 978.

144 Id
145 I
14

6 Rgma ofUni. ofCaL, 715 P.2d at 601-02.
147 Hnmdr, 692 A.2d at 978.

148 Id
149 Se Navato v. St. Imke's Hosp. of Kan. City, No. 90M)068-CV-W-6, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18456,
at *5-*6 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 1991) (recognizing that the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission considers resident physicians to be employees).
150 Se, id at *&r*7 (recognizing the "potential for liability on the part of the hospital for the interns'
negligence" exists, if the right fcts are presented).
151 Karns, supra note 136, at 64 & nn.99-102.
15 2
Nm, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18456, at*6.
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States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Lipsett v. Universip of Puerto
Rico, held that a resident physician was an employee and a student.' 53 For
other medical realists, the distinction between student and employee is
virtually immaterial. In Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that although the work
status of resident physicians does not resemble that of traditional employees,
because abusive work practices may negatively affect their future
employment opportunities, judicial relief from such practices is
appropriate.154
To date, the Connecticut Supreme Court may have constructed the
best attempt to reconcile the problems caused by the apparent dual nature
of the resident-physician identity by combining the medical-deferentialist
and medical-realist approaches.155 In Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, a
dismissed resident physician sued the residency hospital. 56 The hospital
administrators claimed that his dismissal was due to several poor
performance evaluations based on the resident physician's alleged "inability
to make decisions in the operating room, his unwillingness to accept
responsibility for errors," and gaps in his "'knowledge base.'" 57 The Gupta
court reasoned that if the alleged breach concerns educational issues, the
court should consider the resident physician a student and defer to the
decisions of the residency hospital;s58 however, if the alleged breach
concerns employment issues, the court should consider the resident an
employee and apply the appropriate judicial scrutiny.15 9 The court refused

153 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding, for purposes of Title VII, that a medical resident
is a student and an employee); seealso Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1997)
(reasoning that residents are employees, for Title VII purposes); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Mich.
Employment Relations Comm., 204 N.W.2d 218, 226 (Mich. 1973) (reasoning that resident physicians
are no less "employees" than new lawyers employed by law firms who are, undoubtedly, continually
"acquiring new skills"); House Officers Ass'n v. Univ. of Neb. Med. Ctr., 255 N.W.2d 258, 261-62
(Neb. 1977) (holding resident physicians are both students and employees, but in the context of the
Nebraska statute resident physicians are employees); Ryan v. Univ. of N.C. Hosps., 494 S.E.2d 789, 790
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (reasoning that resident physicians are both graduate medical students and
employees because they perform services in exchange for compensation and training). But see Bd. of
Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82-83 & n.l (1978) (assuming that medical resident
was a student for purposes of procedural due process).
154 842 F.2d 291, 294-95 (11th Cir. 1988) (deciding that even though resident physicians are students
rather than employees, they may bring Title VII claims because termination of medical residency interferes with
employment
opportunities).
15 5 Se Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111, 116 n.10, I 17(Conn. 1996).
156 Id at 112-14.
15 7
Id at 114.
158 Id at 119-20.
15 9

Id at 120.
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to render judgment on the merits of the dismissal, on the ground that the
dismissal was due to deficient clinical performance, a decision the court
deemed related to academics, rather than employment.160
The Gupta court reasoned that unlike decisions regarding salary and
benefits, a resident physician's evaluation is akin to a medical-school
professor's grade.' 6 ' In its appeal to medical deferentialism, the court
posited that judges are not qualified to render opinions as to the attainments
of a medical student.162 However, it also made an attempt to hew to the
medical-realist approach, reasoning that when an educational program fails
to offer any of the courses or training necessary to obtain certification in a
particular field or fails to fulfill "a specific contractual promise distinct from
any overall obligation to offer a reasonable program," breach-of-contract
claims may be had against the residency hospital.'6 3 The court thereby
acknowledged the viability of a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.164
Despite limited judicial application of the implied covenant of good
faith to employment arrangements, the Gupta court's posture supports the
assertion that conduct on the part of a residency hospital may be inimical to
the implied good-faith duty of performance. Given the unregulated nature
of the relationship between residency hospital and resident physician,
application of common-law formulations is appropriate, since the court has
not been tasked with assessing the general quality of the education.'6 5
Nevertheless, research has not revealed any cases holding that a residency
hospital's imposition of arduous duty hours that cause severe sleep
deprivation upon resident physicians breaches the implied duty of goodfaith performance applicable to contractual arrangements. Equally notable
is the lack of any decision or even dicta indicating that the abuse of such
discretion does not represent a breach of the duty of good-faith
performance.
Logic dictates that disregard of the duty of good faith essentially
authorizes residency hospitals to circumvent obligations demanded by the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the guise of

160 Id at 117-18.
161 Id
162 Id at 119-20.
163 Id at 120. But se Ross v. Univ. of Minn., 439 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (refiing to
apply the implied doctrine of good faith because hospitals have autonomy in deciding whether to dismiss
residents for academic reasons).
164 Gupta, 687 A.2d at 122-23.
165 See id at 116-18 (supporting a functional analysis not based on rigid labels).
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educational autonomy, which essentially denies resident physicians the right
to challenge certain categories of improper conduct in all fifty states. The
absence of relevant case law, inconsistency within the federal judiciary
regarding the work status of resident physicians, and the increasing degree
of harm and economic losses associated with patients deaths caused by
resident-physician sleep deprivation all weigh strongly in favor of the
application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a
juridical tool against abusive duty-hour requirements. The next section
delineates the extent to which the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing requires a court to infer, from the residency agreement, a residency
hospital's obligation to limit resident physician duty hours.
V. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GoOD-FAITH PERFORMANCE AS A
JUDICIAL SOLUTION

The law of contracts governs the relationship between the residency
hospital and the resident physician. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
states that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.166 Charles Fried, in his influential book Contract as Promise,167
asserted long ago that one of "[t]he most direct challenge[s] to the
conception of contract law as a coherent expression of the principle of
autonomy is thought to come from the doctrine[] of good faith."168 The
implied duty of good faith authorizes courts to revise arrangements or
overturn them "in the name of fairness." 6 9 It challenges the concept of
contract as promise by providing that a promise, alone, is insufficient to
define the duties between contracting parties. 70 The doctrine holds that
even when there is an explicit agreement, the parties' rights are affected by
what the courts and society judge to be a fair distribution of the advantages
and burdens between the parties, in addition to-or possibly in
contravention of-the express terms of the agreement.' 7'

16 6 RESTATEMEr (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcas

§205 (1981); sa als

Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC

Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806,820 (Mass. 1991); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y.
1933). By use of the tern "good faith" in this Article, the author intends to limit the discussion to good-faith
pegfrmmre rather than Enrawzt, ntgowaAss, or it'aftcom between fiduciaries. Of the three texts relevant to the
doctrine of good faith-the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the Uniforn Commercial Code, and the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods-this Article focuses on the common-law
doctrine found in the Restatement (Second) ofContracts.
167 CHARLEs FRIED, CONTRACrAs PROMIsE A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBUGATION (1981).
168 Id at 74.
169 Id

10 d at 75.

171 Id
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Despite widespread commentary on the subject and after more than
seventy years of litigation in the wake of the first recognition of an implied
good-faith contractual obligation by American common law, academics and
courts have not articulated any single or universal concept of contractual
good faith.17 2 Ideas about what satisfies the good-faith duty of performance
are not concretely defined but rather are shaped by the needs of society in
general and determined by repeated resort to community standards and
social benefits that would be forfeited but for the court's intervention.'7 3
Because it is a function of continually emerging standards of decency, the
adaptability and elasticity of this concept make it well adept for a wide
range of applications.
Whereas some observers have applauded the tool as 'an indispensable
measure of contractual morality," 74 others have criticized its use because
of its reliance on moral idealism or public morality, which arguably makes
its application problematic and ill-suited for contractual formulations.
Professor Clayton Gillette, for instance, argues in favor of a narrow
application of the implied duty of good faith on the ground that it hinders
the ability of businesspeople and their attorneys "to predict the legal
consequences of voluntary transactions."' 75 Professor Gillette posits that the
realization of such a prediction "requires precision of definition and
certainty of the effects of performance and nonperformance."' 7 6 In line
with Gillette's view, Professor Michael Bridge also rejects the role ofjudicial
opinion in determining what is just or fair under a good-faith analysis. 77
For Professor Bridge, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
the intellectual equivalent of uncertainty because it is "tantamount to saying
that the good[-]faith duty is breached whenever a judge decides that it has
been breached. . . . [which] hardly advances the cause of intellectual

inquiry[,] and it provides absolutely no guide to the disposition of future
cases." 78 Similarly, Professor Steven Burton, whose contributions to the
17 2 The lIkke La she& court was recognized in Cenmics Corp. v. Gazirom Corp. for providing the "frst
explicit reognition of an implied good faith contractual obligation." 562 A.2d 187, 191 (N.H. 1989).
173 Neil G. Williams, Ofe, Accptanr4 and hIpmper Consideratons.A Commnn-Iaw Mode for de 1nakibiion of
RacidalDisimninatanin the COnracngPmess, 62 GEo.WASH. L REV. 183,206-07 (1993).
174 See Christensen v. Kingston Sch. Comm., 360 F. Supp. 2d 212, 225 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting
Tory A. Weigand, The Duyv of Good Faith and FairDealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 MASS.
L REV. 174, 174 (2004)).
175 Clayton P. Gillette, Limitaonae OblationofGoodFaid,1981 DUKELJ. 619,621(1981).
176 Id
177 Michael G. Bridge, Does ATgl-Gmadian CatractLm Ned a 1chrine of Good Faih, 9 CAN. Bus. LJ.
385,398 (1984).
178 Id; see ao E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Peformance, in GooD FATm AND FAULT IN
CONTRACT LAW 153, 162 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 2002) (quoting Bridge, spr note 177, at
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body of scholarship on good-faith performance cannot be ignored, states
that the doctrine of the duty of good-faith performance acts "as a license for
the exercise ofjudicial or juror intuition" and leads to unpredictable results
and inconsistent applications.179
Common to each of these objections to the implied covenant of good
faith is the insistence on prediction as a normative character of law. By
extension, these objections denounce the infusion of moral principle when
deciding the outcome of contractual arrangements because of its perceived
ruinous effect on predictability. 80 Although an exhaustive defense of moral
theory goes beyond the scope of this Article, the aforementioned claim that
a court's appeal to moral principle facilitates the weakening of contractual
arrangements and therefore warrants a separation of law and morality
requires some attention to the extent that these sentiments qualify as
meritorious objections to the application of the implied covenant of good
faith.
A. The Implied Duty of Good Faith and the Separatists' Theory of Good
The separatist argument for predictability bears the imprint of
allegiance to nineteenth-century positivism, during which "the destinies of
American commerce, industry[,] and finance" were a primary concern
guiding jurists.181 It extends from the "latent social ideal of the nineteenthcentury law of contract [that] embodies a libertarian state, in which the law
maximize[d] the liberty of individual citizens, encourage[d] self-reliance,
398).

I79 StevenJ. Burton, Breach ofContractand de Cmmon La Duy to Pefom in Good Fait, 94 HARv. L REV.
369,369-70(1980).
180 Professor Summers, perhaps one of the most influential writers on the implied covenant of good
faith, took a defensive posture in response to csiticisms that the implied covenant of good faith is a creature of
moral idealism. See Robert S. Summers, The GaeralDAy of Good Fa -ts Rxgia and Coepuicairon,67
CORNELL L REV. 810, 834-35 (1982). Summers denied the presence of empirical evidence indicating that
courts have resolved good faith cases by resorting to moral doctrine and asserted that moral imperatives have had
a de nirrnis impact on good-faith applications. Id Commentators have fiequently expressed strong concern that
application of the good faith duty is flawed because ofits reliance on public morality, but
the extensiye case law to date does not reveal any significant tendency of this kind....
The risk of overextension is inherent in any doctrine. Experience to date indicates that
the risk is not great with regard to [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing]. Our
contract law has been relatively flee ofmoralism, especially any forms legitimately describable
as "Good Samaritanism" or the like. Moreover, legal good faith is not identical with moral
good faith... In addition, [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing] incorporate[s]
safeguards. And the determinations of trial judges and jurors are subject to various forms of
review.
The ultimate question is whether the gain is worth the risk.
Id at 834-35 (footnotes ornitted).
181 EDwlN W. PATERSONJURISPRUDENCE* MEN AND IDEAS OFiTHE LAw 121 (1953).
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and adopt[ed] an avowedly neutral stance with regard to permissible
patterns of social life." 82 For separatist adherents, the law of contracts is
not only "a convenient way of understanding the social relations of a market
economy" but also representative of the state's limitation of its authority in
the name of respecting individual autonomy.'8 3 Faith in individual
autonomy and rationality undergird the separatist's confidence in the
fairness of the distributive outcomes of a relatively uninhibited market.
The idea of faith in individual preferences that is so deeply rooted in
separatism begets a belief that when parties contract each party is made
better off by the exchange.184 "The claim that individuals know what is best
for themselves" metamorphoses into a claim that what they are contracting
for is "eo ipso right for them."' 8 5 As a result, the separatist approach
accepts that two parties should have the right to contract and perform their
obligations without interference so that they can achieve better outcomes
for themselves by acting on their individual specific knowledge and in their
own interest.186 In this way, the separatist theory of contractarianism
catapults free choice into the realm of moral rightness,'8 7 facilitating a
presumption that contracts are inherently just and that they enhance wellbeing.<88

In so doing, this theory accepts law and morality as separate

domains, simultaneously viewing (1) the law of contracts as the foundation
for a maximally efficient system of exchange and (2) the moral demands
that regulate behavior as both an individual responsibility and a threat to
the certainty of outcome believed necessary for contractual arrangements to
flourish.189 Separatism encourages a belief that the law should overrule only
those agreements that are not truly voluntary. 9 o Hence, judicial revision of
contracts on the ground of fairness is perceived as undermining the role of
the uninhibited market in determining the distribution of wealth.191
There are several drawbacks to the separatist theory of good. First, its
acceptance of contracts as intrinsically just provides a vehicle for avoiding
an evaluation of the substantive merits of each party's choices, which could

182 HUGH COLuNS, THE LAW OF CONTRAcr 4-5 (2d ed. 1993).
183

Id at 5.

184

RUSSElL HARDIN, MORALHrY WrTHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON 113 (1988).
185 Id
186 Id
187

Id at 114.

188 Id at 113-14.
189 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 77w Divager of Conract and lomis, 120 HARV. L REV. 708, 713-14
(2007).
190 S& COLUNS, wpra note 182, at 5.
191 eid
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facilitate harmful consequences.' 9 2 That is, by limiting our concern to
whether a contract was entered into voluntarily, we fail to consider that
performance of its explicit terms may produce an outcome that, while
predictable, frustrates the purpose of the agreement or harms society in a
variety of ways.' 93 Also, it further assumes a connection between the
choices explicitly stated in the agreement and the outcome flowing from
those terms when such a relation may not be present.' 94 Few would claim
that Libby Zion's death was naturally related to her choice to seek medical
attention for an earache or an intended outcome of the contractual
arrangement between the resident physicians treating her and New York
Hospital. Performance of their agreement, as it was presumably set out, led
to predictable-but-dire consequences.
What the Libby Zion case more tellingly indicates is that, depending on
the ordering of performance, contractual arrangements may have
substantial utilitarian value or none at all. For this reason, objections to
incorporating considerations of the desired outcome and public welfare
when ordering performance under contractual arrangement represent
nothing more than refusal to let moral concepts play their appropriate role
in the legal process.' 95
According to Friedrich Nietzsche, "[i] t is in the sphere of contracts and
legal obligations that the moral universe of guilt, conscience, and duty ...

19 2

DON HERZOG, HAPPY SIAVES: A CRTIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 222 (1989); HARDIN, spra
note 184, 9at3 114.
1 Parties to contracts, particularly relational contracts, are incapable of predicting all of the events and
conditions that may affect their transactions in the future. See COLuINS, afpra note 182, at 272. Also, the
transaction costs of making contracts limit the resources that the parties are willing to devote to the contracting
process and thus restrict the parties' ability to arnive at a contract that perfectly reflects their agreement Id Even
when the parties have the requisite foresight and resources to draft a contract reflecting their agreement in all its
present and future dimensions, a judge or arbiter may be unable to apply that contract accurately or
inexpensively. See Kent Greenawalt, A PhabstAppmrahto kinretaon: Wi and Cnfcts, 42 SAN DIEGO L REV.
533, 572-74 (2005). The parties involved may have had different understandings of what the contract tenns
signified or different perceptions of what tenms the contract contained. One party may realistically have
authored more tems than the other. Id at 573. Parties may believe that their relations will not be governed by
the terms of the written contract, but rather by principles of fairmess. Id Even a party aware of an unfavorable
term may not believe that the contracting partner will rely upon it or the various contractual prvissions point in
different directions. A contract may contain a clause that one or neither of the parties sufficiently understood
could produce onemus results that neither party foresaw. S&P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND ILAW 14950 (1981) (giving example of variable mortgage rate contract); see also FRIED, supra note 167, at 87 (recognizing
that one "may not know what is included in a system until the question arises").
194 HERZOG, mipra note 192, at 223-24.
195 Mathias Reimann, HoibleHobna, 100 MICH. L REV. 1676,1679 (2002) (criticizing Oliver Wendell
Holmes,Jr., because of his perceived attempt to separate law frotm morality).
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took its inception." 96 Few obligations are more recognized than the moral
requirements arising from voluntary promises in contract. 9 7 By the act of
promising, a party morally and legally obligates itself to obey the commands
and restrictions of that agreement. 98 Even criminals, warring states, or
armies, which may largely dismiss or disregard all other moral duties, will
often regard themselves as bound by their agreements. 9 9
The undertaking makes what was once morally indifferent or optional
for a particular person into something he or she must do. 200 Therefore,
when parties enter into contracts, the exchange involves simultaneous
participation in a moral and legal relationship. 20 1 This requires negotiation
of two distinct sets of norms. For the contractual arrangement to possess
legal authority, "the content and normative justification" for the exchange
"must be acceptable to a reasonable moral agent with a coherent, stable,
and unified personality." 202 The justification for law cannot depend upon
the law being opaque or amoral because its ability to constrain behavior is
limited or subject to override by moral demands. 203 If it is to command
authority, the law cannot require moral agents to do or refrain from doing
something inconsistent with leading a life of at least minimal moral virtue.204
Here, the practices promoted or facilitated by the law of contracts should be
compatible with a culture that supports morally virtuous character. For this
reason, the utilitarian value of contracts relies on a theory of good that
encompasses evaluation of the strictures of public morality.
My claim is not that the law of contracts should aim to enforce
interpersonal morality per se. Rather, the postulation is that its doctrinal
structures and formulations should be compatible with conditions necessary

196 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY, n CLASSICAL READINGS IN
CuLTURE AND CIVIUZATION 95,99 (John Rundell & Stephen Mennell eds., 1998).
197 S* eg., CHRISTOPHER HEATH WEILMAN & A.JOHN SIMMONS, IS THERE A DUTY TO OBEY THE

IAW? 115(2005).
198 Id at 116.
199
Id at 115-16.
200 jULES STEINBERG, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND THE IDEA OF CONSEW: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF POLTICAL OBLIGATION 12 (1978).
201 Id
20 2

Shiffiin, .wpra note, 189, at 717; .w abo Samuel VincentJones, Has Gmduct in Iraq Confamal dwe
Moral
Inadaptacy of IntaonalHIonmI&an Law? Emnnig the Conjiance Belan Conbtact Thany and die Scope of COviian
Inmmozity IDoingAnnal Gm)ct, 16 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L 249, 259 (2006) (stating that "inexplicit obligations
and rights can be inferred 'from the values undelying the explicit rules only if the explidt rules are coherent"'
(quoting Ken Kess, Cohamce andFonnati~n,16 HARV.J.L & PUB. POL'Y 639,646 (1993))).
20 3
Samuel VincentJones, 1af, de Autziy ofloag and UnilatalHrntmimanm Itovation, 39 U. TOL L
REV. 97,111 (2007) (discussing the authority of law and its vulnerability to moral objection).
204 Shifflin, wpranote 189, at 709.
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for morally desired outcomes to surface. 205 In essence, a theory of good
relative to the law of contracts is without support absent some evaluation of
the moral consequences promoted or likely to be so by performance or
nonperformance of a contractual act. 206 Objections to the role of standards
of morality in ascribing rights and duties in contractual arrangements, as an
affront to certainty of outcome, stand at odds with the utility of using moral
principles within the sphere of contractual arrangements.
Implied promises, for instance, are well-established juridical tools used
to make words and conduct binding on a person when circumstances make
such inferences morally appropriate. 20 7 What makes such implications
appropriate is the recognition that a particular promise will produce more
utility amongst society, rather than exclusively for one or both of the parties.
P.S. Atiyah graphically illustrates the point that when one orders a meal in
a restaurant, the patron does not say, "'I promise' [to pay for this meal] or
anything remotely resembling it."208 Jurists would agree, nevertheless, that
a legal obligation to pay for the meal plainly arises. 209 Jurists would assert
that the implied promise is derived from the patron's conduct. 210 Atiyah
notes, however, that "there are difficulties with this traditional explanation.
What of the person who does not intend to pay ... for the meal supplied to
him in the restaurant?" 2 1' If a person who does not intend to pay for a
restaurant meal is said to have communicated a promise in exactly the same
way as the person who actually does intend to pay, it seems odd to say that
an actual promise creates the liability in both cases.2 12 Some brush aside
this difficulty based on an 'objective test' of promise or assent[,]" thereby
creating a means to construe the appearance of a promise from the person's
conduct rather than his or her intent. 213 This response, though reasonable,
dismisses the deeply entrenched conception that the central requirement of
a promise is a voluntary undertaking. 214
To imply a promise suggests that the person is bound-that is, the
person is obligated to pay for the meal because the person promised to pay

205

S&id at 710.

206 STEINBERG, wpra note 200, at 13.
207
Se Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164,165 (A.
20 8
ATIYAH,.npra note 193, at 173.
209 Id
210 Id at 173-74.

1907).

211 Id at 173.
212 Id
213 Id
214d
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for it.215 It seems equally plausible to assert, as Atiyah observes, that the
person is obligated because society naturally feels impelled to infer a
promise to pay in such circumstances. 2 16 In one instance, there may be an
actual promise. In the other instance, the promise is theoretical. It can be
said that the person to whom the theoretical promise is ascribed is replaced
by an "idealized version of ourselves .

.

. purged of obvious defects," who

rightly perceives and appreciates true virtue and goodness.2 17 The source of
obligation lies not in a voluntary action but rather in the socio-moral and
utilitarian value of requiring those who order and eat meals to pay for those
meals.218 In other words, the promise to pay is implied by a reciprocal
theory that obligates citizens to reciprocate for benefits they accept or
receive from others. 219 Because the outcome of the exchange turns on
society's objective reaction to conduct, rather than the autonomous habits
of the parties, a consistent outcome to the contractual exchange is ensured.
Viewed in this fashion, implied promises or duties can be viewed as
indispensable inventions designed to legitimate the consistent imposition of
obligations in contractual arrangements. These obligations, born of reasons
of fairness and social policy, might appropriately be called morality 22 0 or
what Professor Eisenberg describes as "social morality." 221
Given the needs of social morality, the obligations that flow from the
duty of good faith and fair dealing are more nonconsensual than consensual
in origin. 222 These obligations are rooted in a theory of fairness that
presumes a moral obligation on the part of a party who benefits from the
cooperative sacrifices of others, made in support of a mutually beneficial
exchange, to bear its "own fair share of the burdens assigned within that
scheme." 223 Although the nature of the implied obligations depends on the
purpose of the contract and the expectations of the parties, the parties do
not expressly agree upon these obligations in the contract.224 Instead, the

215

1d

2 16

Id at 173-74.
WEIMAN & SIMONS,.wpratnote 197, at 117.
2 18
ATIYAH,.spra note 193, at 174.
2 19
WEUHAN&SIMMONs,s.pnnote 197,at 116.
22 0
2 17

ATIyAH,

pra note 193, at 176.

221

Melin A. Eisenberg, 77mloWns
th&m in art Lam, 105 MICH. L REV. 559,579-80 (2006);
see also Shiffrin, supra note 189, at 716 ("[fcontract law's aim were to protect against harn suffered frmm breach
ofproise, measured in terms of reasonable reliance, what counts as a reasonable form of reliance might depend
on the cultural context and the degree to which easy trust is encouraged the degree to which trust is encouraged
might, in turn, be a matter settled partly by the norms ofmorality and not merely by cultural customs.").
222 Koeirer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820,828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
2 23
WEHAAN & SIMMONS, .wra note 197, at 119.
224Id at 117.
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law imposes them so that the agreement reflects the normative character of
moral virtues or the collective social voice. 225
In this way, the source of the implied promise is somewhat Kantian in
nature;226 the premise being that contracts require interaction between
parties. Each party approaches the arrangement with a variety of motives
and interests that have the propensity to conflict with one another.227 One
party may actively seek control over the other or they may be competing for
limited resources or freedoms. 228 These opposing interests "set the stage for
conflict. Lack of power and neutrality, along with ... coordination and
assurance problems, prevent persons from solving" matters amongst
themselves. 229 Without some coercion to do what was promised and deter
or control those who would introduce conflict into the transaction, the
contractual arrangement would inevitably produce the constant threat of
upheaval, economic impasse, or anarchy. 230 Great insecurity would result
because each party would represent a potential threat to the other.231 The
law mediates such tensions. Seen this way, the notion that the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing is designed to preserve and protect is not
limited to partisan interest in having mutual promises performed but rather
extends to society's interest in protecting the public from harm and
safeguarding the utilitarian value of contracts. 232 By consistently implying
duties based on individual and societal theories of good, rather than
autonomous and voluntary urges, we are in a better position to predict the
outcome of contractual relations without compromising the utilitarian value
of contractarianism.

2 25

d
226 See id at 122-24 (articulating immanuel Kant's natural duty theory oflaw argument).
227
Id at 122-23.
228 Id
229 Id at 123.

230 Id
231 Id
232 The potentially harmful nature of contracting has been recognized by society's need to
protect certain groups of people from the harshness of agreements they might otherwise be free to enter
into. See Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968) (acknowledging the
"commendable and just" nature of the "'infancy doctrine'). Harm may arise because (1) one or both
parties may be unaware of what is tnuly in their best interest, see id; (2) there may be an underlying
denial of the normative character of labor-protective statutes that facilitate unacceptable exploitation, see
Marc Under, Closing the Gap Between Reich and Poor: Which Side Is the Deparbnent of Labor On, 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 1, 4-5 (1993); or (3) the employer may find it more profitable to expose its
employees and the public to unreasonable risk of harm, see Debra McCloskey Barnhart, 7he Dual Capacity
Doctrinr Piercingthe Exclusive Rensey of Workers' Compensation, 43 U. Pirr. L REV. 1013, 1032 (1982).
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Indeed, long before the recognized establishment of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, judicial adoptions of moral
principles, whether avowed or covert, "brought about a good many
elevations of legal standards" in a wide array of contractual arrangements in
the interests of social morality.23 3 In Cotnam v. Wsdom, the defendant
received emergency medical attention after a vehicle accident rendered him
unconscious.2 34 The defendant denied the existence of a contractual
obligation to pay for the services, on the ground that he could not have
consented to receive medical attention while incapacitated.23 5
The
Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that although there was no
evidence of an actual promise, the circumstances dictated "it shall be taken
that there was a promise . . . ."236
Similarly, in Chicago, St Paul Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co. v.
Belliwith, the court's strong reliance on "public policy"237 led it to hold that
an illiterate was bound by the terms of an agreement, despite the
individual's lack of consent or understanding of the terms. 238 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reasoned that a party to a
contract not only owes a duty to the other contracting party but the party
also owes a duty to the public because of the role that written contracts play
in society.239 Because contracts do not inherently enhance well-being, the
law of contracts has always maintained a role for morality for purposes of
revising, rescinding, or modifying duties when it becomes morally required
to do so. These decisions illustrate how the judiciary weighs what parties
have an obligation to do against the consequences promoted by, or likely to
result by, performing or not performing an act.240 Seen that way, they are
indicative of how the enforcement and implication of promises and duties

233 PATTERSON, supra note 181, at 234.

234 10)4 S.W. 164, 165 (Ark. 1907).
235 Id
236 Id at 165-66 (quoting Sceva v. True, 53 N.H. 627, 632 (1873)); seealso K.A.L. v. S. Med.
Bus. Servs., 854 So. 2d 106, 108-09 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (holding, under an implied contract theory,
that hospital was entitled to reasonable fees for services rendered while plaintiff was unconscious and in
critical condition); In re Crisan Estate, 107 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Mich. 1961) (discussing an implied promise
to pay hospital upon rendering care); Allen Twp. Ambulance Corps v. Renoll, 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 732,
733-34 (1987) (using implied contract theory to hold that an ambulance service that renders emergency
services to an unconscious accident victim is entitled to compensation).
237 83 F. 437, 440 (8th Cir. 1897).
238 I at 441-42.
23 d at 440.
240 Set STEINBERG, supra note 200, at 13 (discussing "teleological theories of moral obligation," which
claim that what individuals are obligated to do "is a function of the consequences promoted by, or likely to be
promoted by, perfonning or not performing an act, where the idea ofconsequences refers to the values promoted
by an act").
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reflect the degree of morality necessary for the utilitarian value of
contracting to flourish, while remaining loyal to our appreciation and desire
for predictable outcomes. Infused properly, moral standards will enhance,
rather than detract from, outcome predictability and certainty. For this
reason, moral principle, via the adoption of Section 205 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, has moved "along the spectrum from a covert
application" to contractual principles of law. 24 ' The doctrine of good faith
represents a twentieth-century attempt to formally "instill morality into
contract law." 242 The development of this doctrine symbolizes commitment
to the fundamental objective of fairness through a "new spirit of contracts"
in satisfaction of "the normative urge of contract law to seek justice in the
individual case." 243 Although my claim here may strike some positivists as
oversimplified, my claim regarding the viability of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing does not rest solely on moral imperatives. Accepting
the role of morality merely provides an additional mean to fully appreciate
the full-range of duties that may be implied in the interest of the public
welfare. Whether public interest is considered or not, it cannot be ignored
that the duties arising from the contractual arrangement between the
resident physician and residency hospital also include duties both expressly
and implicitly assumed by each party,244 which are critical to a court's
ability to articulate the proper distributive outcome. 245
B. The Resident Physician'sDuty-Hour Obligations Under the Residency Agreement
Residency agreements are generally adhesive in nature and likely
include a provision stating something much like the following:
(1)The Program.
The general objectives of the Program are to provide to the Physician a
proper educational experience . .. while simultaneously providing to the

241 LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUrrABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES 113

(2001).
242

Id

243 Id at 113-14.
244 See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118
(D. Me. 2009) (stating that contracts contain "'not only the promises set forth in express words, but, in
addition, all such implied provisions as are indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties and as
arise from the language of the contract and the circumstances under which it was made' (quoting
Seashore Performing Arts Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 676 A.2d 482, 484 (Me. 1996))); see
also FRIED, supra note 167, at 75 ("[D]uties not explicitly assumed by the parties may be imposed if
required by good faith.").
245 FRIED, afra note 167, at 75.
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Hospital's patients a high quality of health care. The Hospital represents
that the Program is, and will continue to be, properly accredited by all
necessary accrediting authorities. The Hospital will maintain its staffing
and facilities so as to maintain such accreditation.... The Physician's duo
time in the Program will be scheduled by the Program Director with due
regard for the needs of Hospitalpatients and the educational interests of the
Physician.

(2) Ob4gations of the Physician.
The Physician agrees to fulfill all educational requirements of the Program
and further to provide safe, effectiveL] and compassionate health care to Hospital
patients during the Program period. Furthermore, the Physician shall
comply with all laws, bylaws, rules, regulations[] and policies to which the
Hospital is subject . . . . The Physician shall comply with all proper

directives and instructions of the Program Director. 24
The residency agreement encompasses basic principles universal to
every contract. The expressed representations are not merely expressions of
intent but binding commitments.247 The representations convey the parties'
objective intent at the time the agreement is made to carry out that which
they have represented that they will or will not do.248 The representations
obligate or commit the residency hospital and resident physicians to
perform their duties regardless of whether they later regret having made the
agreement, change their mind, 249 or lose resources. Put simply, the law of
contracts limits each party's freedom and creates in each party the right to
enforce the promised obligations that are expressed in or can be implied
from the agreement. 250
The residency agreement is also unique. Because of the fluid nature of
the residency training process, the extended duration of the residency
program, and the sporadic and unpredictable nature of the residencyhospital environment, the expressed terms of a typical residency agreement
neither encompass or detail all the obligations between the physician and
the hospital nor delineate a specific formula of duties and tasks. While, on
its face, the expressed terms of the residency agreement authorizes the

24 Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111, 112 n.3 (Conn. 1996) (emphasis added).
2 47
SeE. Alan Famsworth, 1kisiar.%Ii sia SomeBimdg SomeNo4 28 SUFOLKU. L REv. 17, 19-20
(1994) [hereinafter
Ikisiaru] (analyzing when an exprssion is a pmmise).
248
249

Id at 19.
Id at 19-20.

250 Id
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residency hospital to set the amount of resident physician duty hours, it is
completely silent regarding any obligation on the residency hospital's part
to limit the resident physician duty hours to some specific amount. Despite
the contract's silence regarding critical rights and obligations, the
agreement is still enforceable. 25 1
The question is whether the implied covenant of good-faith
performance permits the hospital to exercise absolute discretion to set
boundless duty hours, in light of each party's knowledge of the medical
profession's long history of requiring resident physicians to work extremely
harsh hours at their employer's discretion. Alternatively, does the implied
duty of good-faith performance require the residency hospital to limit duty
hours according to a specific standard? If so, to what amount or degree?
The answer requires multidimensional consideration. On the one hand, the
distribution of rights and duties should bear some relation to the parties'
intent. 252 Despite the standardized nature of the residency agreement, the
clause that empowers the residency hospital with the discretion to set the
number of resident physician hours should be given great weight. On the
other hand, although resident physicians must adhere to the standardized
contract terms, "they are not bound to [accept] unknown terms which are
beyond the range of reasonable expectation."25 3 The benefits exchanged
under the agreement and the reasonable expectations of the parties,
therefore, must inform our analysis.

251 Se Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E 214,214 (N.Y. 1917) (reasoning that a contract was
enforceable because one party was legally bound to use "reasonable efforts" to secure endorsements for the other
party, even though the express terms did not enunciate such an obligation).
252 S* ag., The Winterton, LIC v. Winterton Investors, LIW, 900 N.E.2d 754, 759 (Ind. CL App.
2009) ("When interpreting a contract, we attempt to determine the intent of the parties at the time the contract
was made by examining the language used in the instrument to express their rights and duties." (citing Whitaker
v. Brunner, 814 N.E.2d 288,294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004))).
253 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1981). The comment explains that
[a]lthough customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and are bound by them without
even appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which
are beyond the range of reasonable expectation. A debtor who delivers a check to his creditor with
the amount blank does not authorize the insertion of an infinite figure. Similaly, a party who
adheres to the other party's standard terms does not assent to a term if the other party has reason to
believe that the adhering party would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the
agreement contained the particular term. Such a belief or assumption may be shown by the prior
negotiations or inferred from the circumstances. Reason to believe may be inferred fm-om the fact
that the tenn is bitrem or aprsi, fmnm the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly
agreed to, or fiom the fact that it eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction. . .. This rule is
closely related to the policy against unconscionable terms and the rule of interpretation against the
draftsmar.
Id (emphasis added).
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Under the terms of the residency agreement, the residency hospital
agrees to provide the resident physician with several benefits, including
clinical training, educational instruction, patient-care experience, and,
ultimately, a certification from an accredited residency hospital.254 Because
of the problem of severe sleep deprivation, one of the most obvious factors
within the residency hospital's control that could hinder the resident
physician's receipt of contractual benefits is the number of duty hours the
resident physician is required to work. If the residency hospital imposes
unreasonable work demands that deprive the resident physician of critically
needed sleep necessary for the resident physician to care properly for
patients, the residency hospital prevents the resident physician from
participating in the educational and clinical training components of the
residency program. Thus, the residency hospital's contractual obligation to
provide the resident physician with specialized training and opportunities to
properly care for patients and its right to set resident duty hours are
interrelated. Resident physicians who are left incapacitated by sleep
deprivation are no less a threat to themselves or to their patients than an
intoxicated resident physician and no more capable of benefiting from the
residency agreement than a resident who has been denied access to the
specialized training sessions and opportunities to care for patients.
As noted earlier, the ACGME imposed duty-hour guidelines for
residency hospitals in an effort to solve the problem of sleep deprivation.255
Armed with this knowledge, the resident physician enters the residency
program in order to obtain specialized training and certification from an
ACGME-accredited residency program. According to the express terms of
the agreement, the hospital promises to "maintain such accreditation" and
provide the resident physician with the requisite specialized training
necessary to earn the certification. 256 Regardless of the residency hospital's
conduct prior to making the promise or whether the resident physician
relies on the promise, by promising to comport with the accreditation
requirements, the residency hospital communicates to the resident physician
its intent to comply and commits itself to comply with the accreditation
requirements.2 57 Surely, if at the time the residency hospital promised to

254 Se Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A2d 111, 112 n.3 (Conn. 1996) (exemplifying a typical
resident agreement).
255 S&mom Part LB.
256 Gupta, 687 A.2d at 112 n.3.
257 Se E. AUAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRErrED DECISIONS 55
(1998) (stating that the law of contracts does not require proof ofa promisee's reliance in order for a pmise to be
binding or fully enforceable).

HeinOnline -- 48 U. Louisville L. Rev. 301 2009-2010

302

UNVERSIT OFLOUISV7LLE IA WREVIEW

[Vol. 48:265

comply with the accreditation standards it lacked the intent to do so, such
action would subject the residency hospital to claims of
misrepresentation. 258 Hence, the residency hospital, by its promise, gives up
certain freedoms or opportunities that an unaccredited program may enjoy
and creates in the resident physician a reasonable expectation and right to
enforce the obligations taken on by the hospital in exchange for the resident
physician's labor.
Given that the representations enunciated under the agreement are not
only statements of intent but also commitments, one freedom that the
residency hospital relinquishes is its freedom to engage in conduct that
materially fails to comply with the ACGME accreditation standards. This
constraint on the residency hospital's freedom precludes any opportunity to
use the resident physician in a manner inconsistent with the spirit and letter
of the duty-hour parameters established by the ACGME. If the residency
hospital attempts to use or does use the resident physician in a manner
inconsistent with the ACGME duty-hour limits, the residency hospital
thereby attempts to recapture a degree of control (i.e., unlimited use of its
human capital) that it has already relinquished under the terms of the
residency agreement. This recapturing of opportunities foregone by the
terms of the agreement frustrates the reasonable expectation of the resident
physician and places the residency hospital squarely within the sphere of
bad faith.259
Some may assert that such a finding is indefensible because the
residency agreement explicitly authorizes the residency hospital to set duty
hours. The rationale behind such a claim is that the residency hospital
cannot breach the implied covenant of good faith for doing what the
residency agreement explicitly authorizes it to do. This contention is rooted
in the idea that although a court may fill gaps in a contract, it cannot use
the implied covenant of good faith to vary, overrule, or preclude conduct
unambiguously permitted by the express termS260 or to impose obligations
inconsistent with other express terms appearing in the contract.26 ' For

258 See Diiau, mpra
note 247, at 19 ('The law thus trats a promise made without the intention of
performing it as a fraudulent misrepresentation of the fact that the pmmisor has made the initial decision
announced by the promise.").
259 Se Burton, mr note 179, at 388-89 (asserting that a "quantity-contrling party" acts in bad faith
when they attempt to recapture opportunities that the other party reasonably exqected had been forgone).
260 Sw Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 586 (NJ. 1997) ("[The implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing cannot override" an express contract provision.).
261 Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 663 N.E2d 289, 291-92 (N.Y. 1995); w aLo Guz v. Bechtel Natl,
Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1110 (Cal. 2000) (reiterating same).
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some, because the agreement does not expressly indicate that the resident
physician has a right to have duty limited to a specific number of hours or
that the residency hospital has an obligation to limit duty hours, a breach
cannot be identified.262 Well-established precedent and several other
considerations, however, weigh heavily against the expected merit of such a
claim.
The law requires that we read contracts so that every provision is given
some degree of deference. 263 This requires that the law respect the duties
implied by the residency hospital's commitment to maintain accreditation
and the resident physician's ethical and expressed obligations to provide
effective and safe health care to patients. Respecting those implied duties
compels consideration of the great weight of modem sleep-deprivation
scholarship, which militates against the recognition of an absolute and
unlimited right to set resident physician duty hours.
Secondly, although parties may intend to leave absolute discretion to
only one party without limits and make the issue of good-faith performance
irrelevant, we must ask whether the residency agreement has been so
drafted.264 Contrary to what some may assert, a residency agreement's
mere recitation of the residency hospital's express right to set resident
physician duty hours does not answer the question. 265 To read every
contractual right expressly conferred as an absolute and unlimited right is
"to read the doctrine of good faith . . . out of existence." 266 A residency

262 Se eg., Ins Angeles Equestrian Ctr., Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 323 (Cal. Ct
App. 1993) ("[The implied covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] . . . 'cannot be extended to create
obligations not contemplated in the contract."' (quoting Racine & Laramie, Itd. v. Dep't ofParks & Recreation,
14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992))).
263 S RFSTATEMFNr (SECOND) OF CONTRACIS §202(2) (1981) ("A writing is interpreted as a whole,
and all writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together."); id § 203(a) ("[A]n interpretation
which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the tenns is preferred to an interpretation which
leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or ofno effect. . . .").
264 SeeTymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disregarding the issue of
whether or not a contract was pursued under "the nsbric of 'good faith"' and noting that the object of the cout's
inquiry was "whether it was reasonably understood by the parties" that the contract had certain limitations).
265 Id
266 Id at 1153-54. This is to say that compliance with specific provisions of the contract does
not shield the residency hospital from violating the implied covenant of good faith if, in its perfomance,
it violates implied obligations. SeeMarsu, B.V. v. Walt Disney Co., 185 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a "'breach of a specific provision of the contract is not a necessary prerequisite' to a breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" (quoting Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v.
Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 727 (Cal. 1992))); seealso Pearce v. Manhattan Ensemble
Theater, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (reasoning that a breach of good faith may
be alleged "'where one party's conduct, though not breaching the terms of the contract in a technical
sense, nonetheless deprive[s] the other party of the benefit of its bargain"' (quoting Sauer v. Xerox
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hospital, therefore, may be liable for breaching the implied duty of goodfaith performance simply by doing what the expressed contract terms
permit it to do, if its performance does not comply with implicit demands of
the agreement.267 That is, by exercising its discretion to set resident
physician duty hours-a right expressly permitted by the terms of the
residency agreement-a residency hospital may breach the implied
covenant of good faith. 268
The rationale is that while certain express rights, "even without an
expansive modifier, are implicitly absolute . . . others are not." 269 The
implied covenant of good faith acts as an implied modifier to prevent a
contracting party from engaging in conduct that "'while not technically
transgressing the express covenants ] [] frustrates the other party's rights to
the benefits of the contract"' 270 and the reasonable expectations of the
parties.27' The way in which the implied duty of good faith constrains each
party's freedom depends on the nature of the agreement. 272
Given the unique potential for residency hospitals to prey on or take
advantage of the dependent resident physician while simultaneously
Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 125,132 (W.D.N.Y. 2000))).
267 See United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir. 1981)
("What is wrong with Colgate's conduct in this case is not its failure to communicate a decision to
terminate arrived at before the end of March, but its cessation of performance. Clearly it had an
obligation of good faith performance up until its right of termination was actually effective. The
contract expressly obliged it to use its best efforts in the promotion of Bambeanos. Instead of doing that,
it simply ceased its performance. It stopped manufacturing Bambeanos. It ended its advertising
campaign in Boston and in Syracuse and sold its inventory. Quite simply, it broke its contract when it
terminated its performance, which was United Roasters' contractual due.").
268 In Unitad Reastes, the plaintiff gave Colgate the contractual right to manufacture and distribute
Bambeanos, its roasted soybean snack. Id at 987. 'Tecontract allowed Colgate to terminate its performance at
any time during the test-marketing period so long as it gave United Roasters thirty-days notice. Id After almost
three years, Colgate terminated the contract. Id at 988. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the question was not whether there was a good-faith limitation on Colgate's unconditional right to
terminate the contract but, instead, whether Colgate breached the covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing when it
exercised the express right to terminate the contract. Id at 990. In finding Colgate's performance inconsistent
with the implied covenant of good faith, the court held that a party to a contract may breach the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in perforning its obligations simply by exercising rights expressly
also Bak-A-Lum Corp. ofAm. v. Alcoa Bldg. Products, Inc., 351
conferred in the contract See id at 989-90; s&w
A.2d 349, 352 (NJ. 1976) (finding a breach ofan implied term when one party exercised a right permitted under
the express terms ofthe agreement).
269 TAares, huc., 727 F.2d at 1154.
270 Ins Angeles Equestrian Ctr., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 323 (Cal. Ct App.
1993) (quoting Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Dep't ofParks & Recreation, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 338 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992)).
271 See . Shore Mkts., Inc. v.J.D. Assocs. Ltd. Pship, 213 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that
the implied duty of good faith creates an obligation to recognize conditions inherent in the express terms of the
agreement).
272 Tyndars Inc, 727 F.2d at 1153-54.
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complying with the express terms of the residency agreement, the duty of
good-faith performance is implicated. 273 When the contract confers on the
residency hospital the discretionary right to affect the obligations of resident
physicians by controlling the implementation of express terms, the implied
covenant of good faith requires the residency hospital to remain mindful of
the purpose for contracting "'in accordance with fair dealing."'274 This
requirement is heightened in circumstances where a huge disparity in
bargaining positions exists, where one party is in a position to take
advantage of the other, or where the nature of the agreement makes it
impractical to detail every aspect of performance necessary to effect the
purpose of the contract. 275
In Scarborough v. Delaware, the Supreme Court of Delaware considered
the legality of the state's conduct relative to a plea agreement. 276 The court
emphasized that breach of the duty of good faith occurs when one party's
"'conduct frustrates the overarching purpose of the contract by taking
advantage of [its] position to control implementation of the agreement's
terms."' 277 Since the state was "'always ... in a position to take advantage
of its superior ability to control implementation of the agreement's
terms,' 278 the court viewed itself as having a heightened duty to protect the
weaker party.2 79 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing required the
state 'to refrain from . . . unreasonable conduct [that had the] effect of
preventing"' the other party to the plea agreement "'from receiving the
28
fruits of the bargain."' o

273 Se Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 588-89 (NJ. 1997) (examining "the
independence of the implied duty to act in good faith and the express terns of the contract" and affining the
trial court's finding ofa breach of the obligation of good faith); Wood v. LIcy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214,
214 (N.Y. 1917) (implying a promise of exclusive agency).
274 See
Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 510 (Cal. 1985) ("If there are reciprocal promises
... the fact that the contact permits one party to set or change the price charged for goods or services does not
render the contact illusory. ... The buyer did not have arbitrary power. . .because 'where a contract confers on
one party a discretionary power affecting the rights of the other, a duty is imposed to exercise that discretion in
good faith and in accordance with fair dealing."' (quoting Cal. Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co., 289
P.2d 785, 791 (Cal. 1955))); set als Schell v. LifeMark Hosps. of Mo., 92 S.W.3d 222, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)
(discussing the implied obligation to exercise reasonableness when contracted terms leave discretion to one party
over another).
275 Pizza Mgmt., Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1154, 1178-79 (D. Kan. 1990).
276 938 A.2d 644,652 (Del. 2007).
277 Id (quoting Cole v. Delaware, 922 A.2d 354,359-60 (Del. 2005)).
278
Id (quoting Cole, 922 A.2d at 359-60).
2 79
(9
280 Id (quoting Cole, 922 A.2d at 359).
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Given that the residency hospital is always in a position to take
advantage of the resident physician when the residency contract, by its
terms or its silence, grants the hospital the discretion to set or determine
resident physician duty hours, an obligation arises not to deprive the
resident physician of the value of the contract. A corollary of the hospital's
duty to resist depriving the resident physician of the benefits of the contract
is an obligation "to observe reasonable limits in exercising that discretion,
consistent with the parties' . . . purposes in contracting."28 1 The question
thus becomes, what are reasonable resident physician duty hours within the
context of a good-faith analysis?
C. What Is a "Reasonable" Limit on Resident PhysicianDuThHours?
Justice David Souter, then a justice on the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, considered the issue of reasonableness for purposes of goodfaith performance in Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp.282 He asserted that
whether the exercise of discretion exceeds the bounds of reasonableness for
purposes of good-faith performance depends on (1) the "common purpose
or purposes of the contract, against which" (2) the reasonable expectations
of the complaining party "may be measured" and to which (3) "community
standards of honesty, decency[,] and reasonableness can be applied." 283
This framework provides an important normative dimension to the process
of determining reasonableness. It focuses on the intrinsic quality of the act
of contracting as well as the desired consequences of that performance.
Thus, any construction of reasonable limits on the residency hospital's
exercise of discretion includes not only elucidation of the parties' reasonable
expectations but also deliberation of public identity of the contractual
arrangement. As a methodology, this is distinct from the traditional-and
perilous-libertarian narrow focus on efficiency and individual intent.284

281 Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193 (N.H. 1989).
282 Id at 193-6.
283 Id at 193-94. Justice Souter's analysis tecognizes Pofe-sor Robert Summers' "view that the
obligation of good[-]faith performance is better understood .. .as excluding behavior inconsistent with common
standards of decency, . . . reasonableness, and with the parties' agreed-upon common purposes and justified
expectations" Id at 191 (citing Summers, supra note 180, at 820, 826); se alw Pizza Mgmt, Inc. v. Pizza Hut,
Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1154, 1180 (D. Kan. 1990) (determining reasonableness by looking, fist, at whether a contract
condition is reasonable and, second, at whether it is reasonably applied under the circumstances).
284 See Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002) ("The fundamental,
neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties'
intent.").

HeinOnline -- 48 U. Louisville L. Rev. 306 2009-2010

2009]

THE MORAL PLAUSIBIIIY OF CONTRACT

307

When attempting to honor the mutually agreed-upon duties the parties
voluntarily assume under the residency contract, the law imposes a duty to
consider medical-community standards of decency and the reciprocal
nature of the cooperation essential to successful performance of the
residency contract.2 85 The doctrinal expansion of the duty of good faith as
the normative core of the contractual relationship ensures that these
important dimensions are both recognized by the parties and enforced by
Hence, finding an appropriate definitional standard of
the courts.
reasonableness relative to resident physician duty-hour limits requires more
than evaluation of the particular dimensions of the individual transaction; it
also involves an examination of the institutional roles of the residency
hospital and resident physician as defined by the prescriptions of public
morality.28 6
In fashioning a definitional standard, one must remain mindful of the
appeal for some level of medical deferentialism. A trier of fact's freedom to
determine whether the residency hospital's decisions are sound could
seriously compromise the residency hospital's ability to exercise its own
expertise and professional judgment in setting resident physician duty
hours. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the substantive merits of medical
realism. The residency hospital's representations that it will provide the
resident physician with educational and clinical benefits are promises. The
obligations extending from those promises include a duty to act in a manner
consistent with the residency hospital's institutional role to provide proper
care to patients. Consequently, part of this role includes considering the
undeniable harmful consequences of sleep deprivation.
To reconcile this tension, the affirmative duties incorporated in the duty
of good faith require one to look no further for guidance than medical
community standards. Indeed, judges may derive concepts of public
decency and fairness from their own experience in living in the community
or consult an industry in determining whether performance comports with
community standards.28 7 The implied covenant of good faith imposes
obligations like those of tort law by recognizing duties that emanate from
social policy rather than from the private intentions of the parties.2 88

285 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACIM§ 205 ant. a (1981) (explaining the duty ofgood faith
and fair dealing); see aLio Williams, mpra note 173, at 206 (discussing duty of good faith and fair dealing).
286 See Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faidk. Dfinig a University's Educational Obligation to
Student-Athletes, 28 HOUS. L REV. 743, 779 (1991) (acknowledging a duty among colleges and universities
to assist student-athletes in acquiring an education).
287 Sm PArrERSON,.npa note 181, at 239-41.
288 Tort law generally allows for recovery under negligence for breaches of contractual duties in
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Indeed, "one who performs or fails to perform her contractual obligations
in bad faith is not only liable for breach of contract, but may also be liable
in tort." 289 Tort cases, therefore, can be instructive as to how a court might
turn to community standards or social policy when deciding reasonableness
in good faith cases.
In Kelty v. Wseman Construction Co., for instance, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant was negligent in failing to provide its employee, a carpenter,
with a reasonably safe place to work and violated its duty when it failed to
institute certain safety measures to prevent its carpenters from falling, as the
plaintiff did, while working. 290 The plaintiffs expert witness testified that
"there was an established set of safety standards applicable to the
construction industry," commonly referred to as "consensus standards,"
that were not followed. 29 1
The construction company, conversely, introduced evidence showing
that some of the consensus standards were not, in fact, the custom and
usage of the construction industry. 292 The Kely court held that "[a]lthough
there was substantial evidence that it was not the custom in the trade to
employ safety nets, rails, or lines for carpenters constructing external walls
at the edge of the second floor deck, such custom is not conclusive as to the
required standard of care." 293 In recognition of the risk of potential harm at
issue in the case, the court reasoned that "' [c]ourts must in the end say what
is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal
disregard will not excuse their omission."'294 As in Keiy, the court is
required to say or confirm what each party knows or should know is
required by public morality because of the implied covenant of good faith.
Considering the analytical framework applied in Key and the
complexities of the resident physician-residency hospital relationship, one
instances where the breach rises to the level of constituting misfeasance (e.g., affirmative acts of
negligence) on the defendant's part, as compared to mere nonfeasance. Eg., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 321, at 870 (2000). Thus, when a defendant promises to act under a contract and simply
fails to do anything (e.g., nonperfonnance), the contract action in many instances is the only remedy
available to the plaintiff, and no tort recovery is allowed. Se4ee.g., Newton v. Brook, 32 So. 722, 723-24
(Ala. 1902) (holding that only the contract action would lie when the defendants contracted to prepare a
body for shipment on a certain train and then failed to perform the promise).
289 DIMATTEO, .wfra note 241, at 114; s&, aim DOBBS, .om note 288, § 321, at 870 (discussing same).
Some commentators, however, have asserted that tort law is ill-suited for addressing the problem of residentphysician sleep deprivation. EgLee,Wra note 1, at 210.
290 349 N.E.2d 108, 109-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
291 Id at 112.
292 Id
293 Id at 113.
29 4
Id (quoting The Tj. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932)).
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need not look any further than the duty-hour standards enunciated in the
ACGME guidelines to resolve the question of reasonableness. Like the
construction company in Kely, the residency hospital owes a duty of care to
its resident physicians and patients. ACGME standards, like the consensus
standards in Kelty, are designed to safeguard and protect. Regardless of
whether the residency hospital accepts the ACGME guidelines as
customary within the medical industry or lacks the intent to frustrate the
purpose of the residency contract,295 society as a whole, via the implied
covenant of good faith, imposes a duty to comply with the ACGME
guidelines.
In addition to facilitating compatibility within a culture that supports
morally virtuous character and reasonable expectations of the parties,
recognition of a good-faith obligation to adhere to ACGME duty-hour
limits has several other advantages. First, given that ACGME sponsors the
residency hospital, recognizing ACGME standards as reasonable standards
within the medical industry is analogous to the usage of trade evidence
typically referred to in commercial exchanges. Reference to (and reliance
on) the ACGME guidelines on the question of reasonableness is, therefore,
completely defensible. Second, an implied contractual duty to limit duty

295 In Nmthon Camm, Inc. v.
wnicd Spmialies, Inc., the court considered a marketing support
agreement between the plaintiff, a wood-treating company, and the defendant, a chemical company. 332 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1185-86 (W.D. Wis. 2004). The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a specified amount for
every pound ofwood-treating chemical sold in the plaintiffs region. Id at 1187. The defendants sublicensed the
wood-treating technology to one of the plaintiffs competitors, who began selling the chemical in the plaintiffs
region. Id at 1187. When the plaintiff sought payment under the marketing support agreement, the defendant
claimed that it did not owe the plaintiff a royalty because enabling another company to make sales was not the
equivalent of selling wood-treating chemical in the plaintiffs region. Id The court found that while the
defendant may have technically complied with the terms of the contract, the defendant breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by repudiating the purpose of the contract. Id at 1189-90. The
reasoning was that the plaintiffs expected benefit was to be compensated for its labor in promoting the woodtreating chemical. Id By sublicensing to a competitor and refusing to give the plaintiff royalties, the defendant
breached an impliit obligation of the agreement, which prevented the plaintiff from reaping the benefits of the
contract, increased the plaintiffs competition in its market, denied the plaintiff its contractual right to royalties,
Oussmm court rejected the contention
and fustrated the purpose of the agreement Id at 1188-90. The Ntn
that a party can breach its duty ofgood faith only by intentional bad-faith acts. Id
Similarly, in 4 v. Rntice-HaA Inc., the United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit held that
although a publishing contract with an author contained no restriction on the publisher's discretion to expend
resources in promoting the author's book, the publisher was bound in good faith to make an effort that would
give the book a reasonable chance ofsuccess. 717 F.2d 671, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1983). The rationale is that, in such
circumstances, parties are "forced to confer control of a contract term, or discretionary authority, upon one
another, leaving each to depend on the good faith of the other." Pizza Mgmt., Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 737 F.
Supp. 1154, 1178 (D. Kan. 1990) (citing Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., 217 F.2d 63, 65 (10th Cir. 1954)).
That conduct is actionable when a party's performance becomes unreasonable as it relates to a term of the
contract. Id at 1178-79.
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hours to ACGME standards comports with the residency hospital's societal
function to provide quality health care to patients and its obligation to
adhere to the agreed common purpose of the resident physician-hospital
relationship.296 Third, a definitional limit of resident physician duty hours
comports with the universal public policy favoring the protection of hospital
patients.29 7 Fourth, it also helps the court prevent or quell opportunistic
behavior on the part of the residency hospital, without overreaching or
substituting its exercise of judicial discretion in areas that may properly lie
within the expertise of medical professionals.298 Fifth, it also precludes the
residency hospital from recapturing opportunities objectively inferable from
the express terms of the residency agreement that the hospital bargained
away at the time of contracting299 and permits the court to carry out its
heightened duty to protect basic principles of contract law. Lastly, a party
pursuing a breach-of-contract claim, whether it is a resident physician or
patient that is an intended third-party beneficiary of the resident-physician
agreement, allows for a longer statute of limitations than does tort claims.30 0
In addition, the breach-of-contract claim alleviates the need to prove
reliance or the scienter attendant to misrepresentation claims or hospital
negligence.o'
In short, the lack of legislative oversight and judicial
uniformity, coupled with the significant risk of public harm due to residentphysician sleep deprivation, weighs in favor of courts permitting an
additional legal means to address and reduce the degree of medical errors
related to resident-physician sleep deprivation.

296 See Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2004) (stating that a hospital's
primary function is to provide a place in which doctors can provide health-care services to patients).
297 See Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) (recognizing public policy of hospitals
to protect patients); Highlands Hosp. and Health Ctr. v. Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun.
Employees, No. CIV. A. 95-170, 1996 WL 163947, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 1996) (recognizing the
dominant public policy to protect patients from harm).
298 See Mann Farms, Inc. v. Traders State Bank of Poplar, Mont., 801 P.2d 73, 73-77 (Mont.
1990) (in deciding whether bank breached covenant of good faith, court restricted itself to looking at the
parties' performance and obligations within the context of the creditor-debtor relationship).
299 See Burton, spra note 179, at 389-91 (discussing breach of contract due to a party failing to perform
in good faith).
300 S eg., Douglas R. Richmond, Liabiy swer in de Sale gfly Irurounce, 40 TORT TRIAL & Ns. PRAC.
LJ. 877, 908 (2005) ('The advantages to alleging a breach of contract to a plaintiff are the longer statutes of
limitations for contract claims than for tort claims, and the lack of need to prov reliance or scienter attending an
alleged misrepresentation.").
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CONCLUSION

As discussed, every year, approximately 100,000 patients die because of
medical errors,30 2 some of which are linked to sleep-deprived resident
physicians.303 This Article has examined and evaluated legislative and
judicial treatment of the problem of sleep deprivation within residency
hospitals and the social costs of leaving the problem unabated. The
penchant of the judiciary to decline evaluation of the performance
obligations enunciated under residency agreements because of appeals to
medical deferentialism has facilitated a perpetual state of worker duress
among resident physicians, essentially rendering them exempt from
traditional judicial and legislative protections. This juridical gap has
facilitated an economic and humanitarian state of emergency.
As
illustrated, the law of contracts is properly suited to respond to the moral
urge to resolve the problem of sleep deprivation without encroaching upon
the libertarian strictures that prioritize efficiency and certainty of
contractual outcomes over the demands of social welfare.
The doctrinal expansion of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as the normative core of the contractual relationship requires that a
residency hospital adhere to the resident physicians' reasonable
expectations and align its discretionary acts with contractual purposes and
community standards of decency, so as not to deprive the resident physician
of promised benefits. Because the directives of contract law and morality
may constrain or regulate the same behavior, its subjects have to negotiate
two distinct sets of norms, both of which are interrelated.
The
methodological approach to construction advanced here considers not only
the intrinsic quality of the act of contracting between the resident physician
and residency hospital, but also the morally desired consequences of the
promised acts in the distribution process when deciding rights and duties.
By so doing, the construction prompts a finding that residency hospitals
have committed to limit resident physician duty hours commensurate with
the guidelines promulgated by the Accreditation Council for Graduate
Medical Education.

302 See Cow1,.wpr note 27 ("[Ihere are about 100,000 medical[-]ermr deaths a year in this country,
and many of them can be prevented."); m also Klevens et al, swpra note 27, at 160, 163 (reiterating same);
President Barack Obarna, mria note 25 (reiterating same).
303 Lee, srapm note 1, at 162 ("In recent years, there has been an increase in the public's awareness of
medical errors committed by hospital intems and residents who have been acutely and chromnically sleep-deprived
as a result of extremely long work hours."); .w alm Parker-Pope, rma note 16, at A23 (national publication
drawing the public's attention to the problem).
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